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PREFACE
This book is written for those concerned with making wind turbines a safe
and reliable energy source. Although several wind turbine manufacturers have
incorporated lightning protection into their designs, the basic principles and
design techniques used for lightning protection of wind turbines are not
available in a single publication. We hope this book will assist wind energy
manufacturers as they examine all the factors of a wind turbine environment.
After alerting the Wind Energy Conversion System (WECS) designer to the
hazards of lightning, the techniques for protection are discussed. It is
hoped that the text is "user friendly" and the suggested techniques can be
incorporated into the wind turbine designs. Even though the fundamentals of
lightning protection remain the same, new components and techniques are being
developed. If the wind turbine designer developes an understanding of the
_undamentals and works with lightning protection component manufacturers, the
results should be a protection system which makes the turbine relatively free
from lightning damage.
The organization of the text is shown in outline form in the table of
contents. Chapter I presents an overall view of the lightning protection
problem. Chapter 2 covers so,he important fundamentals concerning llghtnlng,
wind turbine structures, and grounding. The remaining chapters cover the
special topics of generating equipment protection, electronics protection, and
blade protection.
This work would not have been done without the funding provided by the
Department of Energy through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
at Lewis Research Center, under the Cooperative Agreement NCC 3-7. We
a '
cKnowledge their support. H.V. Bankaltis of NASA assisted us by providing
information and suggestions as we gathered and put together the information in
this book. Several suggestions made by Leonard Gilbert of NASA are
incorporated in the text.
Experience with llghtniqg in aerospace and power industries have been a
good source of information. Besides looking at past and current literature,
several reviewers have made valuable suggestions. Dwight Sulter of NASA made
some helpful comments. The suggestions offered by F. Dawalibi were used to
strengthen Chapter 2. Keith Crouch of Lightning Technologies, Inc., also
reviewed the text. David Begley's contributions on fiber optics and
electro,lic-component da;nage are appreciated. The suggestions by Don
Cunnlngham have made the text more readable.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Thls book provides information about lightning protection of wind
turbines. Because significant amounts of energy can be produced from the wind
it is important to have a reliable turbine. Providing lightning protection
will make wind systems more reliable and beneficial.
Because areas of favorable location for wlnd turbines coincide with areas
of thunderstorm activity, lightning protection systems need to be provided for
wind turbines. The maps of Figure I.I [i] and Figure 1.2 [2] show that in
most areas where the wind energy density is high there are 30 or more
thunderstorm days per year. Both the experimental Mod-O wind turbine at Plum
Brook, Ohio, and the experimental 17-m Darrieus Turbine at Sandia Laboratories
in Albuquerque, New Mexico, have received lightning strikes that damaged
electronics equipment [3]. The Mod-0 machine also had a kilowatt-hour meter
destroyed and puncture damage to the blade.
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Figure 1.2: Wind Energy Distribution in the Continental United States.
A wind turbine array located in an area that has 30 days of thunderstorms
per year and covering a square mile would average around four strikes per year
[4]. This means about one strike per 7.5 thunderstorms that pass over the
wind turbine area. The damage to this wind turbine array will depend on the
characteristics of the wind machine, the power and instrumentation cable
connections, and the magnltude of the strike.
It is important to remember that wind turbine components are more exposed
to lightning damage than are the components of ground based plants. The
electrical and mechanical components mounted on a tall structure placed in an
open area are exposed to a more hazardous llghtn[ng environment than
components mounted at ground level in an enclosed building. Strikes directly
to turbine blades, towers, instrumentation, and electrical components will
Occur.
It should be pointed out that experimental machines will receive more
lightning damage than production model machines. Experimental machines
normally have more electronic equipment and this equipment Is highly
susceptible to damage from overvoltage. Because personnel are normally around
experimental machines, safety precautions must be taken when thunderstorm
activity Is in the area.
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The amount of damage occurring to the different parts of a wind turbine
depends on many factors. Since the peak current in a strike may vary from a
few thousand amperes to over 200,000 amperes, the current characteristics of
the lightning strike are an important factor.
In the protection of transmission lines, substations, and transformers,
utility companies normally expect some damage even though protection is
provided [5]. The same philosophy is adopted in the protection of wind
turbines _rom lightning damage. As the quality of protection improves the
cost will increase. Wind turbine designers must make cost Judgements when
considering lightning protection.
The methods of protection explained in this book are based on the theory
that lightning damage is minimum if a low-impedance path to ground is
provided. The low-impedance path causes much of the lightning current to flow
away from components susceptible to lightning damage. The general plan of
this book, therefore, is to discuss the following topics:
o Installation of Good Ground Systems
o Protection of Generating Equipment
o Protection of Electronics
o Protection of Blades
[
Protection of the blades, the bearings, the generator, and the electronic
components all require that a good ground exists at the turbine site.
Existing codes discuss methods of obtaining a ground and partially define what
is meant by a good ground. Chapter 2 contains design direction for personnel
responsible for installation of ground systems at the turbine site. Ground
system design should be considered early in site selection and preparation
procedures.
Generators on towers are susceptible to lightning from strikes on the
tower and from currents induced on the power lines. The standard techniques
used by the power industry are applied to line surge protection of generators
[6]. However, because currents also may enter from blade strikes or na_:elle
strikes, standard protection techniques give only partial protection to the
generator. The generator control equipment for synchronous machines contains
semiconductor electronics or relays which require special protection. Use of
surge arresters and capacitors for generator protection is discussed in
Chapter 3.
In recognition of the qceptibillty of electronic components to
above-normal voltages and cu nts, manufacturer's data sheets normally
specify limits for electronic components which must never be exceeded.
Keeping the voltages and currents from coursing through the electronics of a
_mb
w_nd turbine during a lightning transient can be difficult. Damage to
semiconductors from near or direct strikes has been documented at wind turbine
sites [3]. Since damage to electronics can cause shutdown and economic loss,
efforts to minimize this kind of lightning damage must be incorporated in the
lightning protection of wind turbine design. Protection techniques for
electronics are examined in Chapter 4.
The experience with lightning damage to aircraft is valuable when
considering techniques to protect the turbine blades [7]. Details of blade
protection techniques needed for metal, wood, fiberglass, and composites are
described in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 also describes and discusses the results
from simulated strikes to form a basis for blade protection recommendations.
Mechanical components such as bearings, gears, hinges, and hydraulic
pumps can be damaged from lightning strikes. Lightning damage to bearings on
large dish antennas has occurred when procectlon was not provided. The book,
Lightnlng Protection of Aircraft [7], indicates flap hinges have received
damage. However, reports in the literature are sparse in the area. Use of
the recommendations in Chapter 5 will make the wind turbine less susceptible
to mechanical component damage from lightning. It is unlikely that a wind
turbine tower will be damaged from a lightning strike. Since some turbines
could have composite, fiberglass, or even reinforced concrete towers, a few
precautions taken durlng fabrication and/or construction would be worthwhile.
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Chapter 2
GROUNDING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
To better understand this and subsequent chapters an overview of
lightning characteristics and lightning interaction with structures is
provided. Based upon such interaction, the concept of grounding is broadened
to include all structures that efficiently and safely conduct the lightning
charge into the earth where it can be harmlessly dissipated.
i
2.2 LIGHTNING
From an electrical point of view, the negatively charged earth's surface
and the net positively charged ionosphere comprise a giant capacitor. During
fair weather, the capacitor creates a vertical potential gradient of about I00
volts per meter at the earth's surface. When a thunderstorm is overhead the
polarity of the field reverses and potential gradients _ncrease to several
thousand volts per meter.
The total world capacitor discharge current averages approximately 1500
amperes through the imperfect insulator of the atmosphere. There are some
2000 thunderstorms in existence at any given time that regenerate the
capacitor charge. Specifically, the cloud-to-ground lightning replenishes the
earth's negative charge.
The above broad concept of this important consequence of lightning opens
the door to many questions about the nature of the thunderstorm and the
physics of lightning. However, most of the principles of lightning protection
can be related to the characteristics of the lightning current waveform.
Although lightning currents have been measured, the variability between
flashes necessitates a statistical treatment when discussing the various
parameters of concern (e.g. peak currents, rate of rise of current, number of
strokes in a flash, etc.). This chapter focuses upon lightning
characteristics and the relationship of these characteristics to grounding
systems. Interested readers may consult any of the several excellent texts
[1,2,3,4] to learn more about atmospheric electricity and lightning.
6
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Figure 2.1: Model of a Thunderstorm Cell Above a Wind Turbine Site.
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2.2.1 Lightning Characteristics
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A model of a thunderstorm cell is shown in Figure 2.1. Typically, the
vertical dimension is many times larger than the lateral width. The base of
the cloud is negatively charged, causing an induced positive charge to
accumulate on the nearby terrain. When the electric field reaches a critical
value, an ionized discharge channel called a "leader" issues forth from the
base of the cloud. In rapid succession "step leaders" (short extension of the
leader) increase the length of the channel as it moves stepwlse toward
positive charges. If a step leader approaches the earth, it may be met by a
streamer discharge from some point or structure on the earth's surface. Upon
completion of the circuit, the rush of current, called the ground return
stroke, illuminates and expands the ionized channel. This latter highly
visible and energetic return stroke is what most people would consider
"lightning". Such a cloud-to-ground lightning flash may contain several
return strokes of diminishing current amplitude. A typical model of the
lightning current is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Model of Typical Lightning Current.
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There are several possible variations in lightning discharges, including
the more common cloud-to-cloud discharge, and there are several lightning
classifications (e.g. ball, ribbon, bead, etc.). Leaving further study of
these to the academically curious, only one other type of discharge will be
mentioned. Positive lightning flashes sometimes initiated by very tall
structures or structures on very high terrain transfer positive charge to the
earth. Such discharges may have peak currents exceeding I00,000 amperes.
As might be expected, there are significant variations in lightning
parameters, though most cloud-to-earth discharges release more than i00
million joules of energy. A typical flash has sufficient energy to melt
almost a ton of copper. Fortunately, much of the energy dissipation is
associated with the physical phenomena of the discharge channel. Figure 2.3
[5] illustrates the variability in discharge current, and Figure 2.4 [5]
illustrates the variability of the rate of rise of the lightning current
waveform shown in Figure 2.2. For both figures the abscissa indicates the
percent of lightning flashes that will yield a given peak first or second
return stroke current or a given rise time. For example, Figure 2.3 indicate_
that about 5% of all l_ghtn_ng flashes cou!4 exceed a maximum peak current of
I00,000 amperes.
1000
I, I L
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Peak Currents
for Return Stroke and Subsequent Strokes.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Rates of Rise.
2.2.2 Strikes to Structures
Most likely lightning attachment points are blades, air terminals
(lightning rods), the nacelle, or protuberances near the top of the structure.
Upon being hit, the entire structure becomes a part of the lightning discharge
path. From the attachment point to the ground the lightning current will flow
predominantly through the lowest-lmpedance paths available. See Section
2.3.2.1.
In addition to direct strikes to the structure, nearby lightning flashes
and other sources of electromagnetic impulses can induce currents and voltages
sufficient to damage vulnerable electronic components. Such external threats
may produce, along the wind turbine structure, electric fields that exceed
i00,000 volts per meter, whereas a few volts above normal operating voltages
can destroy many electronic components.
Although these indirect threats pose some special protection problems, a
grounding system designed to accommodate direct strikes best serves all
transient protection needs. Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, all
comments in this chapter refer to direct strikes to the wind turbine
IO
,] ... /
structure.
2.2.2.1 Probability of Lightning Strikes
The calculation of strike probabilities for a given structure is not an
exact science. Such a conclusion is not surprising given the nature of the
variables; e.g. local weather patterns, the nature of the terrain on which the
structure is located, the percentage of lightning flashes that reach the
ground, and the nature of the structure It3elf. Nonetheless, the simplified
procedure described below often yields acceptable estimates. The average
number of direct strikes to the turbine per year can be calculated from:
S = 4"10 -6 KTh 2 (strikes per year)
where:
S is the average number of direct strikes per year,
K Is the correction factor dependent upon local terrain,
T is the number of thunderstorm days per year as read
from the isokeraunlc map in Figure I.i, and
h is the height of the tallest part of the wind turbine
_normally the blade) in meters.
The above approximate formula is based upon adaptlon of data of
Muller-Hillerbrand [6], Cianos and Pierce [5], and Golde [i]. See Figure 2.5.
These data are most applicable to a temperate climate such as that of the
United States. The correction factor, K, is included in the above empirical
formula to account for local variations in the number of strikes per year.
Local topology, ground cover, wind patterns, etc., appear to have some effect
on the density of strikes at a given location. Certainly the location of a
turbine on a small isolated hill would logically increase the probability of a
direct strike because such a location would increase the effective height. In
the absence of observations by trained personnel, K would be omitted from the
strike equation (i.e. K set equal to one). Trained observers may include
personnel associated with weather stations, communications towers and
antennas, universities, and power companies.
2.2.2.2 Lightning Interaction with Structures
The exact paths taken by the lightning current depend upon the
attachment point and the relative impedances of the paths. Steel structures
tend to be symmetrical, so current should be distributed equally among the
legs or about the structure body. Critical points in the path(s) may include
bearings, enclosures, or wires for electrical or electronic systems, and the
connectlng points to the groundlng system. Nonconducting structures should be
protected by air terminals and down conductors whtch are attached to an
11
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Figure 2.5: Approximate Number of Direct Strikes to Tall Structures.
appropriate grounding system (seo Section 2.4). Vertlcal-axis wind turbines
employ guy wires which carry lightning current to ground. For conducting
towers with cross members between legs, for conducting solid towers, or for
down conductors separated by several meters, the inductance per unit length of
the tower or down conductor may he calculated from the approximate formula
[7l:
L - 0.2 * in(IOOO/r) (mlcrohenries per meter)
where:
r _ the average radius of the tower or down conductor in meters.
For such conducting structures the resistance of the tower may be neglected,
so that the voltage per meter length is:
v - L di/dt.
In this equation, L is the Inductance calculated from the previous
formula and i is the lightning current (see Figure 2.2 for i and Figure 2.4
for di/dt).
12
!
!
i
;i
For all-metal towers, the inductance per unit length is relatively
insensitive to the tower diameter. For example, tower diameters in the broad
range between 3 and 12 meters produce inductances in the narrow range between
I and 1.3 microhenrles per meter. Even for a worst-case condition (see
Recommendation 5 Section 2.4.1) of a single down conductor of radius I cm the
inductance increases to only 2.3 microhenrles per meter. Using current
rate-of-change extremes of i0 kA/microsecond (relatively benign) and 200
kA/mlcrosecond (relatively severe), the peak electri_ fields along the tower
will vary from i0,000 volts per meter to 460,000 volts per meter for the low
and high extremes with the combinations of v, L, and dl/dt considered above.
Thus, a I00 meter tower could experience peak potentials, at the tower top, of
i to 46 million volts with respect to ground. Obviously, the higher field
values would be sufficient to cause insulation failures, flashovers and
hazards for humans. High-resistance grounds, corroded or poor connections to
the ground system, and non-straight-llne down conductor paths increase the
probability of breakdown (flashovers) between the tower and
buildlngs/personnel/llvestock/objects near the tower.
The factor which contributes to larger than expected instantaneous
currents and voltages is the surge performance. When lightning strikes a
given point on the tower structure, voltage and current wavefronts (surges)
propagate along the structure. Hence, the structure becomes a transmission
line which causes reflections whenever the surge encounters any discontinuity
_n impedance of the llne. For a wind turbine, the important and controllable
discontinuity points are: (a) the points of connection of the tower lightning
paths to the ground system, and (b) the end points of the in-ground system. A
hlgh-resistance ground system or a non-grounded tower will '_esult in a
reflected voltage wave that adds to the incident wave and increases the
possibility of sideflashes and insulation flashovers. Conversely, a
low-reslstance ground causes a reflected voltage wave of polarity opposite of
that of the incident wave thereby reducing these dangers.
2.3 GROUNDING FUNDAMENTALS
The following sections address the fundamental principles to be employed
in the design of an effective grounding system.
2.3.1 Purposes of Grounding
2.3.1.1 Lightning Protection
The 1980 National Fire Protection Assoclat[on (NFPA) llghtning protection
cod_. [8] includes a risk index formula based upon six criteria:
I. Type of structure,
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2. Type of construction,
3. Relative locat_on,
4. Topography,
5. Occupancyand contents, and
6. Lightning frequency.
Five risk classificai_lons, ranging from light to severe, are given for
guidance of anyone responsible for designing lightning protection systems.
Based upon the given formula, most wind turbines are assessed in the severe
risk category. For this reason and the high cost associated with add-on
grounding construction, lightning protection should be incorporated into the
original design and construction.
The primary goal of lightning protection Is to transfer the lightning
flash energy into the ground with a minimum amount of damage to the wlnd
turbine. The lightning current paths, whether integral parts of the turbine
structure or special down conductors, should provide protection:
I. for critical mechanical parts (e.g. bearings),
2. against insulation flashovers,
3. against thermal and fire damage,
4. for power equipment and electronics, and
5. for personnel/livestock and secondary structures In close proximity.
As will be discussed In detail In the following sections, damage is minimized
by low-lmpedance paths to ground and by low-reslstance ground systems which
dissipate the energy harmlessly in the earth.
2.3.1.2 Fault Protection
Any power circuit failure, which interferes with the normal flow of
current, Is termed a fault. Most often lightning will create an ionized path
from a point in the power circuit to ground. Current provided by the power
source(s) will flow throllgh this low-lmpedance ionized path (sometimes called
a short circuit). Whenever the sources maintain the ionized path after
lightning current has ceased, a device called a circuit breaker is employed to
interrupt the current flow and to extinguish the ionized channel.
14
The function of the ground system is to accommodate any fault current
possible, whether caused by lightning, insulation failure, or by other
conditions. The worst-case generator fault current can be calculated from the
turbine generator name-plate information. The worst-case current is the
generator short-circult current. Conductors designed to carry the
short-circuit current are generally sufficiently large (No. 8 AWG or larger)
to carry any lightning transient.
2.3.1.3 Personnel Safety
Personnel or livestock at the turbine site are in considerable danger
during an electrical storm. The safest procedure for personnel is to vacate
the site. The site should be fenced to exclude livestock. Absolute safety
for personnel at the turbine site during a lightning flash cannot be assured.
A person touching any conducting part of the structure during a lightning
strike will develop a potential (touch potential) between his feet and the
touch point. Should the insulation between his feet and any conducting part
of the structure (or ground) not be sufficient to prevent arcing, a current
will flow from the touch point to the feet. See Figure 2.6. Current flow
through the body can cause the heart to cease functioning properly and/or
respiratory paralysis.
\
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Figure 2.6: Step and Touch Potentials and Sideflash.
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A person standing on the ground (or floor) will develop a potential (step
potential) between the two feet. Again, insufficient insulation could permit
enough current to flow to constitute a dangerous situation. The most
hazardous step-potential location is near but outside of the base of the
structure. A person standing several feet from the tower is in much less
danger than one standing one foot from the tower base. Nonetheless, personnel
or livestock standing near a tower at the instant of a direct strike to the
tower may be injured or killed by a sideflash if the tower is not properly
grounded (see Section 2.2.2.2).
The above hazards can be reduced by a low-resistance earth-ground system,
well-insulated shoes, and insulated mats. At power substations, a 3 to 4 inch
mat layer of crushed rock is often used. When the crushed rock surface layer
has much higher resistivity than the ground beneath it, body current due to
the step potential can be greatly reduced [9]. Such a surface layer serves a
second function of retarding evaporation of moisture from the earth. Moist
earth exhibits a much lower resistivity than dry earth.
Section 2.3.2.4 discusses methods of obtaining "safe" ground grid
systems. The common denominators for defining "safety" are the step and touch
potentials. Although the factors involved in determining the lethal threshold
currents for humans are highly variable and statistical in nature, the power
industry seems to use consistently a number +f standard assumptions that
apparently provide values that are safe.
The IEEE Standard 80-1976 [9] provides an excellent discussion of step
and touch potential assumptions and methods of calculating safe values. This
standard cites research by C.F. Dalziel who concludes that 99.5 percent of all
persons should withstand, without ventricular fib_illatlon, current determined
by the equation:
12dr <= 0.0135
from which i = 0.116(t) -I/2 amperes,
where:
and
i is the rms current through the body, in amperes,
t is the time duration of shock, in seconds,
0.0135 is an empirically derived "energy constant".
The same publication assumes the body resistance to be I000 ohms for both
touch and step potential calculations. The foot span associated with the step
potential is assumed to be one meter.
The calculation of step potentials within the bounds of the ground grid
are somewhat cumbersome [9,26,28] unless a computer is employed. However, in
the unprotected region beyond the ground system boundary, the approximate step
potential may be calculated from the expression [I]:
V
step
2[I d(d+s)
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where:
Vstep is the potential in volts, 0 is the earth resistivity in ohm-meters, s
is the step length in meters, and d is the distance in meters between the
center of the turbine tower and the person's leg nearest the tower. This
expression assumes a circular ground system and a uniform earth resistivity.
Researchers continue to publish articles
calculations. Consulting current literature
finalizing any design is recommended.
[I0,II] relevant to these
for new developments before
2.3.1.4 Reference Points for System Grounds
For most people, including many electrical engineers, the terms ground,
common, earth ground, system ground, chassis ground, effectively grounded,
resistance grounded, reactance grounded, etc. [19] are confusing.
For power engineers, the reference point for the system ground is
normally located at the source and is a direct connection to earth, where
possible. See NEC article 250 in Reference 12. However, the reference point
for an electronic signal is a much more critical and ambiguous concept for
communications, control, and data processing engineers. When the signal
reference points of communicating systems are at slightly different potentials
due to a ground current flow, the exchanged signal may be misinterpreted.
During a lightning flash to any tall structure, the potential difference
between reference points of some communicating systems may reach millions of
volts. In such cases, the only options available to the systems designers may
be to minimize physical damage and to minimize the consequence of
misinterpreted signals. These situations are discussed in Chapter 4.
There are techniques and procedures which can reduce, and in some cases
avoid, such worst-case situations. Physically locating critical communicating
systems close to one another is a simple but powerful means of reducing
harmful potentials between system and chassis grounds. The techniques of
potential equalization and magnetic coupling minimization as discussed below
are powerful tools as well. Also, see Chapter 4.
2.3.2 Factors in Effectively Grounding Lightning
The following sections elaborate on these factors to be considered in the
design of grounding systems:
o Current Diversion and Magnetic Coupling
17
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Qo Potential Equalization
o Shielding and Bonding
o Earth Connections and Ground Grids
o Earth Electricel Behavior
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2_3.2.1 Current Diversion and Magnetic Coupling
One objective of lightning protection is to divert the lightning current
through low-impedance, non-critical paths to ground. The lightning-protection
designer should minimize high-current paths near enclosures that contain
sensitive components.
For most larger horlzontal-axis machines, the supporting steel tower
structure provides the lowest-lmpedance path to ground. With most of the
current flowing along the outer extremities of the tower, the magnetic fields
inside the structure are greatly reduced. For nonconducting towers, a minimum
of at least three down conductors equally-spaced about the periphery of the
cross-sectlon of the tower should be used.
Additional equally-spaced down conductors will further reduce the
magnetic coupling inside the tower if they share the lightning current.
Sharing is accomplished by common connections. Particularly critical are the
common connections near the top of the tower. Such connections should be made
at a natural equipotentlal surface. For tall structures these surfaces should
be horizontal planes. See Section 2.3.2.2 and Figure 2.8.
Vertical-axis wind turbines may have guy wires that can share the
lightning current discharge. Thus, having good conducting connections to
these wires at the top of the turbine and to low-resistance grounds at the
earth anchor points is very important. Nonetheless, current can flow directly
down the shaft or through the blade structures. If bearings exist in the flow
path, current diversion through shunt conductors may provide sufficient
protection for vulnerable parts. Brushes at one end of the shunt conductors
must be provided to accommodate relative motion between moving parts. There
is negligible value in adding guy wires, beyond mechanical needs, for the
purpose of diverting current from the main shaft. Approximately one third of
the total current will flow down the main vertical shaft regardless of how
many guy wires are used.
The minimization of magnetic fields inside the tower is particularly
important for the protection of exposed wires, cables, and electronic systems.
Self-supportlng trussed structures often employ tubular tower legs in which
cables and wires may be placed to shield them from the magnetic fields.
Completely-enclosed tubular steel towers would exclude all magnetic fields if
there were no openings or unshlelded cable entries. See Chapter 4.
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For horizontal-axls turbines the entire nacelle normally rotates on
bearings located at the top of the tower. If unlimited rotation is allowed,
the power/controls/communlcations cables in the nacelle must be connected to
cables in the tower through sllp rings. To divert lightning currents away
from the bearings and sllp rings, it is necessary to employ a spark-gap skirt
of low inducta_,ce or shunts with brushes as described above. Even with such
protection, a fraction of the current will flow through the bearings and slip
rings.
The possibility of omitting the nacelle shroud or of employing composite
(nonconducting) materials for the construction of the nacelle helps to
illustrate the concept of current diversion. Figure 2.7(a) illustrates
current flow down the blade through the hub, shaft, generator, and bedp!ate to
the top of the supporting tower. Of course, the current will follow the paths
of least impedance. This means the current will tend to spread out to the
external surfaces of the metal. This reasoning follows the concept of skin
effect or internal inductance which is articulated in most electromagnetic
textbooks [13,14].
t
(a) NONCONDUCTING NACELLE
I---_ "x
\ / /
" t / /
\ I I /
(b) CONDUCTING NACELLE
Figure 2.7: Lightning Current Paths in Nacelle.
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Given the same configuration, except that the nacelle is assumed to be
made of metal, the preferred current path will be over the surface of the
nacelle to the tower. See Figure 2.7(b).
2.3.2.2 Poteutlal Equalization
Potential equalization is a key concept in lightning protection.
Ideally, the wind turbine designer should locate all vulnerable components,
communicating systems, and personnel so that their immediate surroundings (or
systems with which they are in contact) are at the same potential. The
difficulty with achieving the ideal can best be grasped by referring to P1gure
2.8.
EQUIPOTENTIAL
SURFACES
_m
\
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Figure 2.8: Voltage Excursions
on and around Tower at One Instant During Direct Lightning Strike.
(dotted lines represent equipotential surfaces)
l
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For this case of symmetrical voltage distribution, it is obvious that
entitles only at the same elevation would be at the same potential. When any
object, (such as the grounded structure in Figure 2.8) is physically connected
at any given level, a local distortion of potential distribution will occur.
The resulting increase in electric field may cause flashovers, arcs, or
Insula=ion breakdown. Where systems at different levels are linked by
conductors, a current will flow between them. The magnitude of this current
will be the instantaneous difference in potential between the two locations
divided by the impedance of the interconnecting conductor.
To minimize lightning damage to diverse systems that are di3trlbuted over
a finite area at different elevations, the tree concept is a valuable aid in
making decisions about local ground-path connections (see Figure 2.9). In
general, the designer responsible for lightning protection should attempt to
connect systems, shields, and machinery that exist at the same level and that
are physically nearby. This process continues downwards, until the earth
ground is reached.
Thus, a lightning flash to one of the branches will tend to flow through
the path of lowest impedance to ground, endangering the fewest number of
subsystems. The interconnection of blocks from different branches can cause
ground loops that may increase vulnerability of some of the systems.
Any system or component that is electrically insulated from others (see
box at top of Figure 2.9) but in the lightning path will simply provide a
short conducting path, then a Jumplng-off point for the lightning channel to
some nearby component.
o,
i 2.3.2.3 Shielding and Bonding
Shielding and bonding are techniques used to divert current from paths
that include vulnerable systems or components. A conducting nacelle, an
enclo3ed steel tower, and the switch gear panel enclosures are all forms of
shields which may be used to reduce exposure of their internal systems to
hazardous voltages and currents. The principles discussed in the previous
section are applicable to the locations of both shields and bonds. Details of
_hlelding methods and design are covered in Chapter 4. For details of
acceptable bonds for a wide range of applications consult Th___eeNational
Electric Code Handbook 1981 [12] and other applicable codes.
Of great concern are the practical problems associated with poor
connections whether caused by improper installation or corrosion. Denny, et
al., [15] address these topics in great detail. Poor electrical bonds in the
lightning path can cause large voltages to appear between interconnected
systems. The lightning current may simply Jump the poor connection causing uo
harm; or the created voltages may endanger llfe; or a new path may be created
by the channel passing to a nearby, and perhaps more vulnerable component.
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Figure 2.9: lllustratlon of the Tree Concept.
(boxes represent components or subsystems)
2.3.2.4 Earth Connections and Ground Grids
A low-reslstance earth ground is desirable because it reduces the touch
and step potent|als described in Section 2.2.1.3. Furthermore, a low earth
resistance reduces the maximum voltages along the tower to help protect
electronics and other components. The _nitlal lightning pulse proceeds down
the tower in much the same fashlon as a pulse travels down a transmission
llne. If such a pulse encounters an open-clrcult termination (by analogy an
ungrounded or very-hlgh-reslstance ground), a voltage wave of the same
magnitude is reflected back toward the source essentially doubling the
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voltages per unit length. Such a situation on a wind turbine promotes
insulation breakdown, flashovers, and danger to humans.
On the other hand, a short-clrcult or very-low-resistance termination
will c_use a reflected voltage wave of opposite polarity of the incident wave
thereby reducing the voltage drop along the llne (or tower) to near zero.
This desirable condition is not attained without some trade-off. Since the
voltage pulse is accompanied by a current pulse, currents and voltages induced
through magnetic coupling will be increased with a low-reslstance ground.
The nature of the wind forces on a wind turbine requires a tower base of
considerable mechanical strength. Because concrete behaves electrically very
much llke earth, such a base is conducive to the design of an effective
lightning path to the earth. It is very important to incorporate the design
of the electrical ground system into the initial design of the tower
base/pad/foundatlons/plers/footlng/rock anchors, etc. These structures extend
into the earth, and they require rei_forclng bars that can also serve the
purpose of conducting lightning current to ground. There are a number of
communication and power transmission llne tower foundations in existence that
were designed to serve the suggested dual function.
Normally, the tower load is transmitted through steel baseplates to a
concrete foundation or appropriate footing. The baseplates are attached with
anchor bolts which extend into the concrete and which can be connected
electrically to parts of the reinforcing bar system. When the steel
reinforcing bar system is utilized as a portion of the ground electrode, the
electrical connections between the tower (or other down conductors) and the
ground electrode are most critical. The connection must be welded or an
approved mechanlcal-electrlcal connection [12,15].
Inside the concrete, the reinforcing bar to which the tower/down
conductors are solidly connected should be as long as practical, and it should
be in contact with a large number of other bars. It is strongly recommended
that additional approved bonds be made untll the accumulated length of solidly
connected bars extends at least twenty feet [12]. This recommendation
applies to each of the ground-electrode connections which normally number
three or four. Many other reinforcing bars should be in physical contact with
the solldly-connected bar by physically laying across it or by physically
tying bars together w_th tie wires. In Figure 2.10 the solidly-connected
electrode is shown in black. The desired net effect is to have the entire
reinforcing bar network act as a single three-dlmenslonal ground grid. A very
large surface area of the ground electrode insures low fault or lightning
current densities so as to minimize breakdown and thermal damage°
In addition to the portion of
reinforcing bars in the tower footing,
more conducting rings just outside the
serve:
the ground electrode formed by the
it is standard practice to bury one or
foundation in the soil. These rings
I. to guarantee equipotential earth around the tower base,
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Figure 2.10: Use of Concrete Relnforclng Bars as the Earth Electrode.
I
2. to reduce touch and step potentials at tower base,
3. to reduce the hazards of sldeflashes,
4. to provide lightning breakdown paths in soll rather than in
concrete or along the earth's surface, and
5. to provide accesslblllty to the outer edge of the ground system.
the
Accesslbllity Is Important whenever further reduction in ground resistance Is
needed after site completion.
Because wlnd turbine sltes are often In rocky or dry high-reslstlvlty
locations, counterpoises attached to the outer ring generally provide the most
practical means of obtaining the desired ground-electrode resistance.
Counterpoises are simply radially buried wires that can be extended to the
length needed to reduce the ground resistance. For very rocky terrain,
counterpoises are sometimes lald on top of the ground. See Figure 2.11 for a
complete ground system.
Ground resistance may be lowered by connecting the ground system to other
non-dangerous conducting entitles such as metal water lines or well casings
(connectlons should never be made to gas or oli plpellnes).
It should be noted that lndlscrlmlnate connectlons can cause problems.
One of the problems Is that of corrosion due to electrochemical effects. If
different parts of the ground system contain metals of different
electrochemlcal potentlals a battery wlll be formed. The more electronegatlve
metal wll! act as the cathode, and ions will be transferred through the damp
earth or concrete, actlng as the electrolyte, to the anode metal. Even with
slngle-metai systems, battery-type currents can exlst where electrolyte
concentrations vary with positions In the soil in which the ground system Isburied.
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COUNTERPOISES
MAY BE ATTACHED
TO OUTER RING
GRID AND RINGS
ATTACHED AT
REGULAR INTERVALS
BURIED
RINGS
Figure 2.11: Ground System
Consisting of Reinforcing Bars, Rings, and Counterpoises.
For the recommended ground system described above, the most practical
arrangement might be one in which the outer rings and counterpoises would be
large stranded copper connected to the reinforcing steel rods. This design
choice illustrates a typlca, trade-off sltuat[on. Stranded copper is employed
in the soil because it is much easier to shape and it corrodes less than 25%
as fast as steel. Because stranded conductors have a large surface area
exposed to corrosion, some countries (not including the USA) do not permit its
ube for underground lightning electrodes. For this reason, stranded wire
should be large (e.g. 300 MCM, 12 strands).
Once such a choice has been made, it becomes necessary to calculate the
amount of electrolytic damage thae might occur. This can be done by employing
Faraday's law:
W = QA/Fn
where W is the weight in grams of material transferred, A is the atomic weight
of the transferred cathode material, Q is the charge obtained by multtplylng
current in amperes by time In seconds, F = 96,500 coulombs per mole, and n is
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the valence of the ion. For the exampleabove, the current, I, is calculated
from the electrochemical potential difference divided by the resistance of the
earth, Rb , between the two parts of the system ground composedof the steel
reinforcing bars and the copper rings or counterpoises. The electrode
potentials (sometimes referred to as galvanic or electrochemical potentials)
of several metals are shownin Table 2.1.
TABLE2.1
Galvanic Potentials of Metals
Relative Potential
Metal (V)
Magnesium and its alloys -1.6
Zinc diecasting -i.i
Zinc plating on steel -1.05
Chromate-passlvated and galvanized iron -1.05
Cadmium and cadmium plating on steel -0.80
Wrought aluminium -0.75
Non-corrosion-resisting steel or iron -0.70
Cast iron -0.70
Duralumin -0.60
Lead -0.55
Lead-silver solder (2.5% silver) -0.50
Terne plate -0.50
Tin plate -0.50
Tin-lead solders -0.50
Chromium plating, 0.0005 in. on steel -0.50
Chromium plating, 0.003 in. on
nlckel-plated steel -0.45
Corrosion-reslsting steel (12% chromium) -0.45
Tin-platlng on steel -0.45
High-chromlum steel, 18/2 -0.35
High-chromium steel, 18/8 -0.20
Brasses -0.25
Copper and its alloys -0.24
Nickel-copper alloys -0.25
Nickel plating on steel -0.15
Carbon (colloidal graphite in acetone, evaporated +0.I0
to dryness)
For the copper-iron case, I = [-0.25 - (-0.70)]/R b . During wet periods
or for Iow-resistlvity soils, it is possible for Rb to be as low as one ohm.
For such a case, the iron transfer rate could amount to several kilograms per
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year. The outer steel rods in closest proximity to the copper rings would be
affected most.
Observers [12] report that corrosion rates will actually be less, often
considerably less, than values calculated as above due to ameliorating
factors. These factors include coatings that naturally accumulate o_A the
electrodes in contact with earth or concrete. Such coatings increase the
effective electrolyte resistance, thus lowering the current flow.
For ground system designers in the process of developing a standard (i.e.
for a wind farm or farms), the performance of both calculations and
measurements on a prototype is an advisable procedure. To perfo_,_n tests to
determine Rb on the current flow, it is necessary to provide for a means cf
physicaJly disconnecting the two portions of the circuit that are constructed
of different materials. Such tests should be conducted after concrete has
cured and the ground has settled. To obtain the worst-case condition (largest
loss of electrode material), a measurement should be performed when the ground
has a high moisture content.
In the event that the projected damage is too large, corrective action
should be taken. Corrective action includes the alternatives of :
a) replacing the rlng/counterpolse system with a metal which has an
electrochemical potential close to that of the reinforcing bars, and
b) installing a sacrificial electrode [i] that is more electronegative
than the cathode material (reinforcing bars).
The vlability of method (a) depends upon matching chemical potentials
with a metal that is rust resistant. The viability of method (b) depends upon
the sacrificial electrode having a potential which is more negative than the
cathode material by a magnitude approximately that of the difference between
the anode and the cathode. Because the sacrificial electrode is eaten away,
it must be periodically replaced.
Heretofore, the dlscusslon has alluded to the resistance of the ground
electrode rather than the impedance. For 60 hertz faults there is little
difference between the two quantities. But lightning is a transient
phenomenon encompassing many frequencies. How should the load impedance of
the ground be modelled for a lightning flash?
This question has been addressed by a number of researchers [16,17,18].
These researchers define a surge impedance as the ratio of the instantaneous
voltage divided by the instantaneous current into the ground electrode. Thus,
the surge impedance is useful in determining the reflected wave on the tower
due to tl>e ground system as its load. The surge impedance varies with time in
the fashion shown in Figure 2.12.
27
Ct_
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
_TII,.
TIME
Figure 2.12: Surge Impedance as a Function of Time.
Even though the surge impedance varies as shown, estimated reflection
values that assume a load impedance equal to the dc ground resistance are
generally sufficient for most purposes.
2.3.2.5 Earth Electrical Behavior
The earth's crust Is a non-homogeneous, anlsotropic, nonlinear and
layered medium. Its electrical behavior is a function of these different
characteristics as well as moisture content, chemical composition, frequency,
temperature, and pressure. Furthermore, characteristics and conditions often
vary markedly between sites.
So, how does the designer responsible for the electrical ground system
cope wlth such a complex medium? The answer may be better understood by
comparing the two extreme conditions of an ungrounded tower and a tower with
an infinite ground system.
Just prior to the lightning flash a large volume of negative charge in
the cloud induces a similar positive surface charge several square kilometers
in extent on the earth's surface. The ionized channel to earth provides a
path for the electrons to reach the earth. If it is assumed that the
lightning channel terminates on a wlnd turbine tower, what happens as the
electrons reach the earth and spread out to neutralize the positive surface
charge? Consider first the case of an ungrounded tower.
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At the point of electron injection, the resistance between the tower base
and other distant points is very large regardless of the electrical properties
at the site. In fact, the IR voltage will exceed the breakdown strength of
the earth and one or more types of breakdown will occur. These include
breakdown in the volume of soll beneath the injection point, breakdown of the
air (sideflash) between the tower and a radial point beside the tower, and
breakdown along surface paths on top of the ground. The latter two cases are
recognized as extremely dangerous to humans, animals, and nearby structures.
This dangerous voltage (or more correctly, electric field strength)
diminishes with distance from the injection point. The rate of decrease
varies somewhere between inverse radius and logarithm of inverse radius
depending upon several of the factors mentioned in previous paragraphs. At
some radius, a point which is considered no longer dangerous will be reached.
At the other extreme, the earth's surface could be covered by a sheet of
hlgh-conductlvity metal extending radially from the tower to the outer edge
of the positive induced surface charge. This economically unrealistic system
would shrink the danger point to essentially zero. It follows that providing
a good ground system to the hypothetical point of danger transition is
sufficient. Physical configurations for such a system are described in
Section 2.3.2.4. The equations for determining this point are provided in
Section 2.3.1.3.
A great deal of effort has been expended to increase the understanding of
the earth's behavior. The resultant knowledge has been employed to find
ground system resistance, inductance, capacitance, breakdown strengths,
current densities, corrosion rates, etc.
For example, all formulas developed to find the resistance of the
variously shaped ground electrodes show the resistance to be directly
proportional to the earth's resistivity. This raises two questions. What
method should be used to measure the resistivity which is used to calculate
the electrode resistance? And, can the resistivity be altered to serve a
given purpose?
Soil resistivity can be decreased by adding moisture and/or chemicals to
the soll [1,19,20]. Except for some special applications, neither practice
has gained acceptance as a practical means of obtaining a low ground-electrode
resistance. To maintain a given moisture content, water must be supplied
almost continuously, while chemicals tend to leach away and to cause pollution
problems.
Resistivity can be measured indirectly. Measurement methods are
described in IEEE Standards [21,22] and in current literature. The four-point
probe method (see Figure 2.13) is considered the most accurate. Instruments
designed specifically to measure resistivity are available (see buyer's guide
or appropriate trade publications).
Four small electrodes are inserted into the earth to a depth "b" in a
straight llne spaced "a" equal distances apart. The electrodes are assumed to
be insulated except at the tips. A current 1 is passed between the outer
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Figure 2.13: Four Point Probe Resistivity Test.
electrodes, and a potential difference V is measured between the inner
electrodes. The ratio V/I Is called the mutual resistance, R. The
resistivity Is then determined from the formula:
4]TaR
I +
2a a
(a2+4b2) I/2 (a2+b2) i72
where _ has units of ohm-meters when length dimensions are in meters. For
this model it Is assumed that the earth Is a homogeneous isotropic medium.
When b < 0.1a the equation reduces to _ = 2 _aR. Another _ethod, the
three-probe method, is widely used, particularly by test equipment
manufacturers. Most equipment manufacturers furnish a manual which details
several methods of measurement and discusses accuracy. However, because of
the variability in weather factors and measurement accuracy, ground system
designers may be quite satisfied with resistivity values within +100% of theaverage value.
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For guidance, IEEE guide [22] provides a very simple table attributed to
Rudenberg. The table is reproduced as Table 2.2.
TABLE 2.2
Average Resistivity of the Ground
Type of Ground Resistivity in Ohm-meters
Wet Organic Soll I0
Moist Soll i00
Dry Soil I000
Bed Rock I0000
Ibbr. •
!.
!,
In point of fact, the designer must design with a worst-case situation in
mind. It is recommended that resistivity tests be performed under different
weather extremes. Very dry conditions will cause the highest (worst-case)
resistivities.
2.4 SUMMARY, GUIDELINES, AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICE
This final section of Chapter 2 presents 13 recommendations for designing
effective ground systems. In so doing, it also summarizes the salient
features of both above-ground and underground current paths which most
efficiently and safely conduct the lightning into the earth. From this point
of view, the above-ground paths are considered as an extended portion of the
ground system.
i) The primary recommendation, which underlies all the recommendations,
is to design the lightning protection system during conceptual planning of the
wind turbine ccnstructlon. Add-on protection is generally costly and less
effective. If risk management techniques are employed, see Sections 2.2.2.1,
4.2, and 4.3.5 for necessary information.
The remaining 12 recommendations are presented in three categories: (a)
recommendations 2 through 7 pertain to the extended ground system, beginning
at the top of the tower; (b) recommendations 8 through I0 pertain to the
ground (underground) system; and (c) recommendations ii t|cough 13 pertain to
protecting personnel at the turbine site during thunderstorms.
. 4.'¸
¢
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2.4.1 The Extended (Above-Ground) Ground System
Beginning at the top of the tower:
2) Air terminals (lightning rods) atop the nacelle are advisable if
vulnerable components (e.g. transducers) atop the nacelle need protection or
if the nacelle is itself not a good conductor. The heights and spacing of the
air terminals are determined by the location of the components. Many
designers accept the cone of protection concept. A region of protection is
formed by an imaginary cone with its apex at the top of the air terminal. The
base radius of the cone is equal to or slightly greater than the height of the
air terminal [4].
3) Damage to components inside the nacelle (e.g. generator, gearbox,
electronics, etc.) may be ameliorated by a metallic nacelle acting as a
shield. Further reductions in current flow through the most vulnerable
nacelle components may be obtained by using methods enumerated below.
4) Damage to bearings and sllp rings may be reduced or eliminated by
providing alternate low--inductance shunt paths around them. The path may be a
spark-gap skirt or metal straps with attached carbon brushes riding on a
smooth surface to accommodate the relative motion between moving paths.
Further reduction in the fraction of current flowing through bearlngs/slip
rings may be attained by increasing the inductance of the path through the
bearings/slip rings. This inductance may be increased by lengthening the
effective path through which the current must flow.
5) Lightnlng-current-carrylng down conductors should be designed to
minimize their self-lnductance or combined inductance if current is shared.
In general, the shortest and straightest path between two points yields the
minimum %nductance. Also, the larger the size of the conductor the smaller
will be its self-lnductance. This means that a conducting tower of large
radius will have less inductance than a thin conducting tower. Accordingly,
the voltage drop along the tower will be smaller for the larger-radlus tower.
For a nonconducting tower a minimum of three de._n conductors spaced equally
about the tower is recommended. Bends and corners in down conductors should
be avoided because they increase inductance and the danger of sideflashes.
6) Guy wires, which are often employed with vertlcal-axls wind turbines,
may be used to divert a portion of the lightning current to ground (see
Section 2.2.2.1).
7) The size of both above-ground and underground "ground" conductors
must be such that they can carry the worst-case fault currents from the power
system, as well as, the lightning currents. Because of assumed longer time
durations for fault currents, conductor size selections are generally dictated
by fault current requirements. Thus, most "ground" conductors are #8 AWG or
larger.
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2.4.2 The Ground (underGround) System
8) Connections within the ground system and at the entry point of the
underground system are permanent or semipermanent. For permanent connections,
welding is the preferred method of bonding. For semipermanent connections,
bolts and clamps are preferred. When experienced welders are unavailable or
where standard welding practices are difficult to follow, the exothermic
Cadweld (TM) process has been employed.
9) The earth ground system should be designed to minimize the touch
potential at the tower base, and its spatial bounds should extend radially
beyond the point at which step potentials are lethal to humans and livestock.
Such a ground system inherently will be a low-resistance system. Spacing of
the connected buried rings or grids outside the footlng/foundatlon of the
tower base is a function of the earth conductivity and the worst-case
lightning current expected. Consult references [1,9,15,23 through 36] at the
end of this chapter for detailed design procedures. Also see Section 2.2.2.4.
i0) Because the tower footing/foundation may extend outside of the tower
base, the portion of the ground system designed to minimize touch potential
must be incorporated inside the concrete. For such configurations it is
convenient and desirable to utilize the reinforcing bars of the
footlng/foundation as part of the ground system. See Section 2.2.2.4.
2.4.3 Safety
ii) It is recommended that personnel vacate the slte during
thunderstorms. For personnel unavoidably at the site during a thunderstorm,
the safest location should be at the center of the tower at the base.
Insulated flooring or mats increase safety. To lessen danger from touch
potential, personnel should avoid touching all metal parts, cables and
equipment.
12) Fences may be employed to exclude both humans and animals. However,
when fences are employed certain dangers should be recognized [9]. If the
fence Is located at least six feet beyond the outermost extremity of the earth
ground system and beyond the point at which step potentlal_ are no longer
dangerous, a fence can be an excellent safety feature. However, should a
counterpoise extend beyond the fence a potentially hazardous condition is
created where the fence and the ground near it may assume a dangerous
potential difference. In very high human traffic areas it may be necessary to
build an extensive earth grid system which extends at least five feet beyond
the fence. In this case the fence must be solidly connected to the ground
grid.
13) For high human traffic areas, it may be possible to obtain
additional safety by depositing a layer (3 or more inches depth) of crushed
rock on the earth's surface. See Sections 2.3.1.3 and 2.3.2.5. For walk-ways
even better insulating mats may be advisable. It should ! noted that the
efficacy of crushed rock over a long period of tlme has been questioned. For
such a layer to be effective, it must have a much higher resistivity than the
soll it covers.
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Chapter 3
GENERATOR COMPONENT PROTECTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Placing a generator on top of a tower will increase the chance of
lightning damage to the generator and its cc_trol components. Generating
equipment normally used by utilities is located close to ground level. Its
location within a shelter gives it protection not available to generating
equipment located up to I00 meters above +he terrain. Methods of protecting
generating equipment are discussed in this chapter.
The characteristics and type of generating equipment on wind turbines
varies with turbine rating. For small turbines, single phase and dc
generators may be used. The generators for large turbines will normally be 60
hertz, 3-phase with llne voltages from 480 volts to 4160 volts. Power ratings
will vary from I00 kW to around 600C kW for most existing and proposed
commercial wind energy systems.
The drawing of a wind turbine in Figure 3.1 shows how some current could
reach the generator if lightning strikes the blade. However, in order to
reach the generator the lightning current would have to pass through the
blade, hub bearings, low-speed shaft, gearbox, and high-speed shaft.
Alternate paths also exist for this transient current so that only a portion
reaches the generator.
A strike on the nacelle or tower could also Induce voltages and currents
in power cables and generator windings. Surges from lightning and switching
on the power lines could also damage the generator. A summary of the sources
of damage is shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 shows a view inside a typical
wind turbine nacelle. The lightning protection designer should consider the
merits of a nacelle fabricated of a conductor, or a nonconducting mgterlal.
If a nacelle is made of a conducting material the threat to the generator and
other tower components is greatly reduced. See Section 2.3.2.1.
The standard techniques for protecting generating equipment from
lightning damage are documented in IEEE and ANSI standards [1,2]. A paper by
Jackson [3] discusses surge protection of rotating machinery. Several general
references [4,5,6,7] at the end of the chapter address surge protection of
generators and other electrical equipment.
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3.2 GENERATOR AND CONTROL EQUIPMENT
Many different techniques can be used to transform the mechanical energy
of the turbine into power line energy. Each design will have different
electrical characteristics and componentq. The final result is a 3-phase 60
hertz voltage that goes to a step-up transformer connected to the power lines.
The remainder of this section describes the most widely used energy conversion
system.
A gearbox changes the low-speed, high-torque energy available from the
turbine blade(s) to a speed suitable for an electrical generator. Whether a
synchronous generator, induction generator, dc generator, or some other
machine is used, the output speed of the gearbox is normally in the 1200 to
1800 rpm range. Although the induction generator is finding some acceptance,
synchronous generators seem to be the most acceptable means for energy
conversion. The methods for protecting a synchronous generator and its
associated components arepresented in this chapter. Protection of other
types of generating systems will have some differences; however, the
techniques for lightning protection for synchronous generators can be used as
a guide for protecting other systems.
Synchronous generators require fairly complex excitation systems. A view
of a typical excitation control system (F_gure 3.4) indicates not only the
field and stator windings need protection, but other electrical equipment may
be subject to surge damage. The suppliers of the control equipment are aware
of possible surge damage and normally build protection into their systems.
Signal and power lines going into control equipment _hould have shlel_s as
described in Chapter 4. As with any lightning protection system, it is
necessary to coordinate transformer, switchgear, control equipment,
transmission lines, and generator protection equipment. The protection of
transformers and transmission lines is normally provided by the utility
company. The control equipment and contactors used for running the generator
will normally be furnished by the wind turbine manufacturer. The turbine
manufacturer should coordinate surge protection with generator and control
equipment vendors and the utility company. Excitation systems should meet the
minimum requirement of some accepted standard [8].
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3 •3 GENERATOR SHIELDING
Placing the generator in an enclosure that provides electrostatic and
electromagnetic shielding, such as a metallic nacelle, would protect it from a
direct lightning strike. Although there are some openings in a metallic
nacelle for ventilation, shaft entrance and cables, the nacelle can be
considered sn equipment lightning shield.
The use of slip rings to pass some of the lightning currents from the
turbine shaft to the nacelle will reduce the amount of current flowing to the
inside of the nacelle. Electromagnetic shield screens placed in ventilator
openings should cut down on energy entry in these apertures. Entrance of
lightning from instrument cables can also be minimized with proper lightning
protection. See Section 4.3.4. The levels of lightning currents and voltages
inside the nacelle can best be determined by modelling and testing at a
hlgh-voltage laboratory.
Experience with a large number of in-fleld wind turbines will also help
establish guidelines for protection of equipment inside the nacelle and
several tower structures. Data must be collected and shared for the benefit
of wind energy development.
3.4 DESIGN CONSIDERATION FOR ELECTRICAL MACHINES
It is possible that equipment contained in the nacelle could have
potential differences that would cause arcing damage. If the frame of the
generator were to reach a potential great enough to overcome the Basic Impulse
Insulation Level (BIL) of the windings, puncture could occur which would
require maintenance. The generator's insulation system must be maintained
when a lightning transient occurs. Because of space limitations it is
generally not possible to insulate generators to the same level as other
electrical apparatus. There are two major problems to deal with in the surge
protection of synchronous machines. First, insulation from winding to ground
must be maintained. Second, the turn insulation must be protected. The
effect of a steep voltage waveform on windings is shown in Figure 3.5 [4].
Reduction of voltage levels between windings can be obtained uslng the
techniques in Section 3.5.
Surge protection techniques for protecting rotating machinery have been
very successful [3]. It is very unusual for a machine to be damaged if
recommended procedures are used. Although placing attesters and surge
capacitors in the nacelle will cause this small area to become more crowded,
they do give an added measure of protection. In some cases, lack of space in
the nacelle may force design changes for the protection system.
A point made by Jackson [3] seems to indicate that to some extent
overprotectlon may cause down time. His argument that reliability can be
reduced by adding unnecessary equipment is certainly valid. If the nacelle
provides adequate shielding and surges entering from the power lines are
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Surge Voltages in Generator Winding.
sufficiently dissipated by the transformer protection, then generator surge
protection equipment is unnecessary. It should also be added that the
temporary overvoltages (TOV's) at the generator due to responses in the wind
turbine control system could cause stress on the arresters.
The security of the generator insulation system is complicated by the
fact that cumulative damage occurs to insulating materials. No simple
techniques are available [9] which can Integrate the cumulative effects of
sequentially applied overvoltages. For example, an item may pass a
hlgh-voltage test for 50 seconds and fall if It Is extended for an additional
IO seconds. Thls means that lightning could have a cumulative effect on
generator insulation materials.
The design example in the next section introduces designers to an
accepted surge protection technique for generators. The added protection of
arresters at the generator is a good Investment. At this point In wind
turbine development it is the manufacturer's and perhaps user's decision to
determine If their generator needs this added protection.
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The example that follows illustrates how to protect the generator by
limiting the voltage stresses from conductor to machine iron ground and
between turns of the windings. The generator is treated as a transmission
llne wlth distributed constants. The voltage along the conductor produces a
voltage between turns. The lower the rate of rise of this voltage, the lower
the stress between turns. The rate of rise can be controlled with a circuit,
as shown in Figure 3.6(a), which consists of an inductance and capacitance in
series [3]. If a constant voltage E a is impressed on the s#rles circuit, the
voltage E c across the capacitor will be oscillatory until the circuit losses
dampen out the oscillations. The voltage, Ec , oscillates about Ea with a
period,
T = 2[I(LC) 1/2
and the time to reach its peak is T/2.
By properly choosing the values of L and C, the time to peak can be kept
to a minimum. The value of Ea also has an effect on determining the rate of
rise as shown in Figure 3.6(b).
Ea C c
Ca)
E1
E2
Figure 3.6:
"-'l/2 T--.-.-I
Ec FOR Ea = E1
Ec FOR Ea = E2
.... _rl-"
(b)
Inductance and Capacitance in Series.
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Therefore three elements are required to limit the rate of rise of
voltage between turns: an inductance, a capacitance, and a way to limit Ea •
E a is limited, in practice, by a lightning arrester at the line terminals of
the distribution transformer. The generator is connected in parallel with the
capacitor so the surge impressed from generator terminal to machine iron
ground is Ec • This system alone will not protect the generator because, as
shown by Figure 3.6(b), E c could exceed Ea , which endangers the insulation
from conductor to iron. To insure good protection Ec should be kept equal to
or less than Ea • This can be done by installing another arrester in parallel
with the capacitor. When E c rises to the sparkover voltage of the second
arrester, it limits Ec as shown by the dashed line in Figure 3.6.
A typical circuit of a lightning protection system for a generator is
shown in Figure 3.7. The in-llne inductance, L, may be an inductor or the
distributed inductance of a length of llne. The capacitor, C, is of special
construction for surge protectlon. The attester for the line is either an
intermediate or distribution type. A special arrester for rotating machines
should be specified for the generator.
L
T I
7777777r
LINE GENERATOR
ARRESTOR A.R_RESTOR
GENERATOR
F._iE
Figure 3.7: Fundamental Protective System.
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FThe purpose of an arrester is to limit the peak voltage. In order to
accomplish this task it must act as an insulator during norv,al 60 hertz
voltage generation. It must act as a conductor to high currents from a
lightning surge. After the lightning current becomes negligible, it must
again act as an insulator to the normal generator voltage.
Selecting the arresters, inductance, and capacitance is illustrated in
the example contained in the next few paragraphs. The data that have been
included in the example will be useful in designing protection for most
generators used on wind turbines.
A generator with a rating of 4160 volts would be a probable candidate for
a large wind turbine. Its power rating and size will depend on the overall
design of the wind energy system.
For a 4160 volt generator a standard 0.5 microfarad surge capacitor is
selected [4,9]. The inductance, L, may be a lumped value [4] or a length of
transmission llne not less than 1500 feet [3]. If the machine's BIL is 12.73
kV, then an arrester which sparks over at a lower level must be selected. For
the arrester, AG, a 3 kV special arrester for rotating machine with a
breakdown voltage of 12 kV [4] is selected. This provides a protection margin
of 730 volts.
The llne arrester, A L , not only protects the transformer, but is part of
the generator protection system. Its rating will depend on the insulation
characteristics of the transformer. It may be an attester that has sparkover
a little higher than the generator's arrester.
Figure 3.8 [3] illustrates a cathode-ray oscillogram of voltages taken
from laboratory tests which show the voltage across the llne arrester, and the
voltage across C with and without the machine arrester, A G .
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3.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The generating equipment of a wind turbine needs some level of lightning
protection. Surge damage has occurred to rotating electrical machinery in
less severe lightning environments. A wind turbine generator can be damaged
not only from power llne strikes, but also from strikes to the blades, the
tower, or the nacelle. Because of space limitations the insulation on
rotating machine windings is held to a minimum. Hence generators are more
susceptible to surge damage than other electrical power equipment.
Several factors must be considered when evaluating the protectlon of
generating equipment. The chances of a lightning strike are related to the
number of thunderstorm days per year and the local topology. As wln3 turbine
arrays develop the chances of lightning entering the electrical systems will
increase. If the power grid connected to the wind turbine has surge
protection, the wind turbine generating system will be less susceptible to
lightning damage.
Not only are the windings of electrical machines subject to lightning
hazards, but the generator's controls and monitoring equipment may be damaged.
Bearings pitted by arcing will fall prematurely. Diodes on a brushless
48
synchronous generator may need replacement after a lightning strike.
electronic controls of a generator must also be protected.
The
Since turbines have a variety of structures and are fabricated of several
materials, the amount of electromagnetic shielding differs with each machine.
Because of these factors it would be inappropriate to make recommendations
that cover all generating systems. However, the following guidelines will be
of value when designing generator protection:
8
4
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o Discuss with the manufacturer the posslblity of modifying the basic
impulse insulation levels of the generator.
o Specify that the electronic control equipment has shielding and surge
protection.
o Provide a shield, such as a metallic nacelle,
generating equipment.
which encloses the
o Coordinate generator and power llne surge protection design.
o Provide protection to special monitoring equipment as discussed in
Chapter 4.
o Provide a by-pass path for lightning current resulting from a blade
strike.
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Chapter 4
ELECTRONIC SUBSYSTEM PROTECTION
Transients caused by lightning may damage the electronics subsystems
and/or cause false data. General lightning characteristics are discussed in
Chapter 2. In this chapter we discuss protecting electronics subsystems by
o describing the characteristics of lightning transients and the means by
which lightning transients gain access to electronics,
o presenting the fundamentals of protecting electronics from llghtnlng
transients, and
o recommending
transients.
practices for reducing the effects of lightning
4.1 LIGHTNING TRANSIENTS
This section discusses two topics: characteristics of lightning
transients and the means by which lightning transients may gain access to
electronic equipment.
4.1.1 Characteristics
Lightning is the rapid flow of large amounts of electrical charge.
Fringe effects related to electric charge flow such as weak electric and
magnetic coupling and electromagnetic radiation usually can be ignored.
However, in the vicinity of any lightning stroke they become significant
phenomena for electronic subsystems. A wind turbine designer must pay close
attention to these effects if electronic problems caused by lightning are to
be averted.
4.1.1.1 Mngn4r,.dp _._ Phyg#C_l nlstributlon
A £1gntnlng stroke may have a peak current from a common 20,000 amperes
to a very rare several hundred thousand amperes [I]. Potential differences
along a stroke path usually average about 900,000 volts per meter [I]. This
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Icauses widespread cranslents of lesser magnitude to flow and radiate foe a
considerable distance away from a main stroke. Solid state devices can be
damaged by lightning transients as shown in Table 4.1 [2].
TABLE 4. I
Typical Breakdown Voltages for Semiconductors
Device Type
MOSFET
JFET
CMOS
SCHOTTKY DIODES, TTL
BI-POLAR TRANSISTORS
Electrostatic Discharge Susceptibility (volts)
10-200
140-10,000
250-2,000
300-2500
300-7,000
.-%/
A wind turbine tower may be viewed as a transmission llne with an open
circuit discontinuity at the tower top and a short circuit discontinuity at
the tower bottom. Such characteristics of a tower would cause an in-phase
voltage reflection of the lightning transient from the top of the tower and an
in-phase current reflection from the bottom of the tower. If the tower is
viewed briefly as a pure inductance of about 2 mlcrohenrles per meter, a
lightning stroke leading edge rising from 0 to 200,000 amperes in one
microsecond would give, E = L dl/dt = 400,000 volts per meter. The
transmission llne discontinuity could then give a worst-case voltage doubling
as hlgh as 800,000 volts per meter at the top of a tower and current doubling
as high as 400,000 amperes could occur at the tower bottom. This analysis
thus gives vglues that a designer can use to make a wind turbine system less
susceptible to lightning.
For a 99+% confidence level, a designer can use the above as maximum
value8 of voltage gradient and stroke current for the lightning transient if
the tower is struck directly. Since the top and bottom of the wind turbine
tower are not perfect open or short circuits, neither perfect wave doubling or
wave cancelling occurg. A maximum of 200,000 amperes at the tower top and
400,000 volts per meter at the tower bottom is assumed for a 99+% confidence
that actual stroke currents and voltage gradient values would always be less
than those used for the design.
By way of comparison, dry air at standard pressure (30 in. Hg.) and
temperature (20 degrees C) ionizes at about 3,000,000 volts per meter [3]. At
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this voltage gradient, Ionized air will carry a lightning stroke along the
path. Such a hlgh gradient can be obtained locally on sharp points as a peak
voltage gradient even when the tower voltage gradient is much lower.
Since the peak current and voltage gradient magnitudes in virtually all
lightning strokes are so large, damaging transients flow and rPqlate across
and through the entire region in all directions from a main stroke for a
considerable dlstance. It is necessary to consider the stroke as a
three-dimenslonal, volume-filllng phenomena. Potentlal differences of
sufficient magnitude to damage electronics may exist between points in space
separated by small distances in any direction in the vicinity of a wind
turbine subjected to a direct or nearby lightning strlke.
a
4 .t.2 Tlme and Frequency Domains
The lightning transient may contain from one to thlrty-four pulses [4].
Each pulse will usually have a steep leading edge and a long trailing tail.
The leading edge may have a rise time from about _rty nanoseconds to a few
microseconds [5]. The steep leading edges of the pulses give rise to a very
wide radiated energy spectrum. The long tall usually lasts over a hundred
milliseconds. It is thls portlon of the pulse in which the bulk of the energy
of the lightning transient flows. Although such a large electrical transient
as a lightning stroke has much electronics damaging energy in the fast rising
leading edge of the pulse, the long trailing tall is the part of the stroke
containing most of the energy. Capacitive shunting, inductive isolation, and
reflective intervening surfaces tend to reduce the high frequency content of a
lightning transient as it travels away from the main dlscharge. Except for
directly encountered lightning fields (without much intervenlng reflective
material or inductlve circuit path), a rlse time of between I and 2
microseconds and an exponentially decaying tall of about 150 milliseconds are
typical, with about 3 or 4 such strokes per lightning flash. The radiated
frequency spectrums of lightning, on average, peaks between 5 and i0 khz and
then decreases as i/f as shown in Flgure 4.1 [6]. The spectrum of conducted
lightning return strokes tends to be flat below several khz, and then fall off
inversely with the frequency squared above several tens of khz [6].
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Figure 4.1: Composite Radiated Spectrum of Lightning [6].
4.1.2 Entry t__oglectronlcs
Lightning transient energy may gain access to electronic equipment by
means of conduction and electromagnetic field coupling.
I
4.1.2.1 Conduction
Transient energy is conducted to the electronics by such paths as outside
power lines, telephone lines, and local sensor and control wires. While
nearby strikes are of concern, a direct wind turbine strike is the most
serious case. The lightning produced voltage gradient acts as a transient
source to spread significant energy in all directions for a considerable
distance. The flow will be in all directions around the electronics, not Just
between cable pairs. For example the path may be along external cable
shields, from the electronics input to the output, or along the electronic
subsystem housing. The total voltage around any closed loop must sum to zero.
This means a voltage applied to one portion of a closed loop forces a
corresponding opposite voltage elsewhere in the closed loop. So if
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sub_tantlal transient current Is conducted along any portion of a voltage loop
(see Figure 4.2), loop potentials can be altered so that the voltage across
electronic components may reach unacceptable levels.
ELECTRONICS
ORIGINAL PAGE 1
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ELECTRONICS
Figure 4.2: Transient Added to Sum of Voltages Around A Closed Loop.
This small piece of the lightning path in common with the electronics loop may
be the common grounding network between electronic clrcults, or from one side
of the tower structure to another point on the tower structure wlth closely
mounted electronics wiring. Lightning may convert some regions of dielectric
into ionized conductors, and thus modify the original wlnd turbine circuit
topology.
4.1.2.2 glectrlc Fleld Coupling
If the 800,000 volts per meter from Section 4.1.i.i Is considered on a
per centimeter basis, the electric field would be 8,000 volts per centimeter.
Many integrated circuits and other electronic components will fit into a space
less than acm. in height, but still will not stand a potential gradient of
8,000 volts per centimeter. Other orientations of the component or leads to
the component could make the potential across the componenc even higher. Any
two conductors separated by a dielectric have some capacitance between them.
If a low-lmpedance path is established to one side of the capacitor (see
55
ORIGINAL PAGE i_
OF POOR QUALrrf
Figure 4.3) from a particular potential and also to the other side of the
capacitor from another potential, then the voltage gradient across the
capacitor dielectric can be larger than the average voltage gradient in the
region. This can lead to capacitor dielectric breakdown.
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Figure 4.3: Low Impedance Access of Transient Voltages
to Capacitive Situations.
If one side of the capacitor Is effectively near ground potential whlle
the other side is at the potential existing many meters up the tower with an
average of 800,000 volts/meter along the tower, dielectric breakdown Is
essentially certain. For example, the shield of a co-axlal cable could be
tied to a ground wire which Is connected to a rod buried In the ground while
the center conductor Is attached to a sensor at the top of the wind turbine
tower. The shield may not be connected at the top of the structure to avoid
ground loop currents flowing through the shield. But a lightning strike at
the top of the wind turbine wlll break through the cable sheath to flow down
the shield to the ground below. On the way a slgllflcant amount of energy may
enter the connected electronics as well. How to deal with these problems will
be covered in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
2'
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4.1.2.3 Magnetic Field Coupling
All lightning transient current flow is accompanied by magnetic flux
linkages between the current flow and with any wires in the vicinity.
Changing flux linkages induce voltages across conductors. So as the transient
current rises in magnitude, the flux linkages increase inducing a voltage in
these wires. The most voltage is induced in wires that are parallel to the
direction of the current flow. No voltage is induced in wires by a transient
current flow perpendicular to the wires. Voltages can be induced into
portions of a voltage loop or the total loop. For example, rather than a
direct current flow through a portion of a loop, as shown in Figure 4.2, the
added voltage V t , could be caused by changing flux linkages from a nearby
lightning transient current flow. Since the changing magnetic flux links both
conductors of a pair it is the difference in flux change experienced by each
wire which results in a net current flow in a loop. For example, wires
separated by I cm. which run parallel to a stroke path one meter away in which
current rises from 0 to 400,000 amperes in one microsecond, will have a loop
transient potential induced per centimeter of length as shown in Figure 4.4
[7]. Notice that two conductors, say traces on a printed circuit board which
are parallel to a tower structure located a meter away, would receive about 8
volts per centimeter of wire pair length. These values represent the maximum
amounts that should be expected at the bottom of a wind turbine tower, per
centimeter of length.
A strike near a wind turbine tower, but not actually contacting the
structure, will induce electric and magnetic fields into the electronics as
discussed above. The distances between the strike and the electronic
components will be such that the induced voltages that are received will only
be significant if long metallic wires are connected to the components, such as
those that may be used to run to sensors or controls. The power and telephone
lines have significant lengths, but pick up little radiated energy since they
:_n in a direction which generally is perpendicular to the stroke path. The
energy radiated from a rapidly rising leading edge of a nearby lightning
strike could reach damaging levels for a poorly protected system. All wires
can be considered as antennas. The gain patterns for various orientations and
lengths of wires will affect the amount of transient induced. This can get
very complicated. However, if direct turbine lightning strike and externally
conducted lightning transient entry are protected against, then virtually all
other sources of lightning electromagnetic energy will have also been
protected against.
J
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Figure 4.4: Net Added Transient Voltage
Induced in a Parallel Conductor Loop
by a L1ghtnlng Transient Current.
t
4.2 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION FUNDAMENTALS
The three fundamental concepts to consider in protecting electronics from
lightning transients are:
o the basic underlying philosophy,
o the protection techniques, and
o maintainance of data integrity.
#
A.2.1 Protection of Electronics Philosophy
Electronics play a key role in many wind turbine systems to provide
critical safety and control functions. The electronic decision making
circuitry of the system operates on information from sensors which detect such
parameters as wind direction and intensity, blade icing, generator and power
line phasing, etc. This data is necessary to coordinate wind turbine power
generation with power system needs and operation, as well as to shut down the
wind turbine when unsafe conditions occur. This latter function of the
electronics requires special attention to prevent spurious wind turbine
actions caused by misinformation (and thus erroneous decisions) when the
system is subjected to lightning strikes. Electronic circuits need not be
destroyed immediately by lightning for a wind turbine system to have problems
caused by lightning. Not only must electronic circuitry be protected from
direct destruction, but also from behavioral aberrations. Weakening of
circuit components by repeated electrical overstress, as well as temporary
false values in data circuits (called upset in digital terminology), can be
dangerous. Upset can be caused in digital circuits by an extra volt added at
the wrong instant. In an analog circuit reactive elements may be forced to
erroneous values and cause a dangerous transient signal. All levels of
voltage from minor noise due to distant lightning radiations to direct strikes
to the wind turbine tower are encountered. Direct strikes are clearly
dangerous, while lesser transients can have insidious effects if not
anticipated in the planning of the wind turbine system. Figure 4.5 summarizes
the different types of lightning strike damage from which wind turbine
electronics must be protected.
4.2.1.1 Multilayered and Multileveled Protection
Multllayer protection (see Figure 4.6) refers to having environmental
regions which are increasingly more benign because transient reduction has
been provided in each layer. It is possible to have an outer shielding and
transient suppression layer which disposes of the main part of the strike
energy. The protection devices in this layer may react a bit slower than the
initial rise of a transient, but can withstand the brunt of the energy from a
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Figure 4.5: Types of Llghtnlng Damage to Electronics Operation.
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lightning strike. Within this outer layer is a region where a smaller
residual transient environment is encountered. Another layer of shielding
with lighter duty and faster transient suppression devices reduces the size of
transients passing through this layer of transient protection. This process
is carried on until an acceptable transient environment is obtained inside the
innermost layer of transient protection.
UTILITY POWER TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
OUTSIDE TELEPHONE LINES
LOW VOLTAGE POWER WITHIN WIND TURBINE SYSTEM
LINES BETWEEN LOCAL ELECTRONICS SUBSYST_IS OF WIND TURBLNE SYSTEM
LOCAL ELECTRONICS POWER LINE
LOCAL ELECTRONICS PO_,_R SUPPLY
INDIVIDUAL ELECTRONIC PRINTED
CIRCUIT ASSEMBLY
INDIVIDUAL
ELECTRONIC
COMPONENT
Figure 4.6:
m
Multilayered View of the Electronic Environment.
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Multilevel protection (see Figure 4.7) refers to the different energy
and/or voltage levels at which transient suppression devices operate. Utility
lines have very large fuces and surge arresters which drain off powerful
direct strike lightning energy, passing on a reduced transient level to the
local service lines. At the local service level, lighter duty devices at
lower voltage levels further reduce the transient level, etc. until at the
component level, transients have been reduced to an energy/voltage level that
can be tolerated without component deterioration. At each stage, the
transient must be reduced to energy/voltage levels that operating components
can tolerate without degradation.
Layers may include physical shlelds, usually taking more than one layer
to reduce all forms of transient entry to acceptable levels. Because levels
of operation of transient devices differ, several levels of protection are
usually needed to provide transient protection.
4.2.1.2 MultLpath
Since a lightning discharge disperses energy in all directions,
electronic devices must be protected not only across input/output pairs, but
also between the input and the output of the devices. Not only must cables
protect data from loss due to normal operating environmental noise, but they
must not be destroyed by the occasional lightning strike. Lateral and
longitudinal protection is required. In Figure 4.8, devices i and 2 provide
lateral protection, while device 3 provides longitudinal protection.
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4.2.2 Electronic Protection Techniques
Two basic techniques, used for electronic _ubsystem protection, are
transient shunting past the subsystem and subsystem isolation from the
transient. In addition, during lightning transient disruption of the
electronics subsystem operation, it is often necessary to retain vital
electronic data until normal subsystem operation and communication on the data
links can be restored. Interruptions may be only for a few microseconds, or
milliseconds, or the time required to replace components.
4.2.2.1 Shunting for Protection
Shunting protection is obtained in two basic ways. One is by directing
most of the transient energy to flow along a relatively harmless, prepared
path, in such a way that wind turbine components are bypassed. The three
primary components of this prepared path are the air terminal, the down
conductor, and the turbine ground .... second way Is to use special devices
at critical locations to shunt that portion of the energy that does not flow
dowe the prepared path.
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JAs discussed in Chapter 2, the air terminal (lightning rod) may be a
special device designed to be a lightning strike attachment point, in some
cases the entire outer surface of a wind turbine may act or serve as a strike
receptor and conduct the current to ground. It is best that most of the
lightning strike energy be conducted down the tower well away from the
electronic components. This means electronics should be located away from
such things as down conductors, tower legs, support wires, and the enclosing
metallic supporting structure. To the extent possible, transient currents
should be either far from electronic component containers or equally spaced
around them. An increased distance means a weaker magnetic field. Equal
spacing about the electronic component containers means cancelling of magnetic
fields as shown in Figure 4.9 and discussed in Chapter 2. Shielding of
electronic components will further reduce the effects of electric and magnetic
transient fields. An ideal shield is a closed cylindrical solid conductive
(often metal) housing structure whose outer surface would also serve to
conduct the lightning transient to ground. Theoretically such a closed
conducting structure has a zero internal magnetic field [7].
At ground level, grounding rods, grids, buried rings, etc., are used as
described in Chapter 2. The transient current should be dispersed well away
from electronics equipment and the associated data, control, and power lines.
Shunting devices include attesters, relays, drainage Inductors, and
suppressors. They act on the principle that the impedance of the desired flow
path is lower than the impedence of the path to be protected. Control over
all potential transient current paths must increase as the distance to the
fragile electronic components decreases. A translent-secure electronics
environment must be obtained during the lifetime of each potentially damaging
lightning transient.
A series impedance is required for a shunting device to limit voltage.
The magnitude of the series impedance is extremely important. The
relationship between the series :mpedance and shunting device is illustrated
in Figure 4.10. Sometimes the series impedance may consist of the resistance
and inductance of the existing wiring. At other times additional inductance
and/or resistance is added to insure that adequate voltage limiting action is
obtained with the shunt protector.
L_ghtnlng arresters usually refer to devices that will drain off energy
at relatively high voltages and currents. These devices may be alr-gapped
carbon blocks, alr-gapped copper, special gas enclosed gaps, etc. Such
devices take many microseconds to operate and may maintain hundreds of volts
across the device even after device conduction has started.
Relays are sometimes wired into the system so that above a specified
voltage, the relay will shunt current flowing down the lines. Relays are
generally very slow acting and are utilized more as a device to protect from a
continuous high voltage on a llne than from a short transient. For example,
this could happen if a power llne accidently falls across a low voltage
communications line and remains there.
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Figure 4.9: Reduction of Magnetic Field Coupling to Electronics.
Drainage fnductors across a llne that normally handles a relatively hlgh
_requency signal will provide a shunt for a much lower frequency content
lightning strike or dc voltage on the llne.
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Suppressors, a type of arrester, generally refer to devices such as gas
tubes. Faster acting devices, in order of increasing speed of action, include
varistors (for example the Metal Oxide Varistor, MOV [8]), zener diode, and
special transient surpressor diode called the Transorb (TM) [9]. In general,
the fa_ter acting the device, the less energy it can handle, another factor
in ]ocatlng protective devices is the rate of propagation of the
electromagnetic wave throughout the electronics. Because of both power and
propagation effects, the fastest devices are placed closest to the component
they protect.
F
4.2.2.2 Isolation for Protection
While shuntirg a trat,slent nrovldes a lower-lmpedance path, isolation is
Just the opposlt_. IsGlation tech, iques make the impedance higher for the
transient energy in directions or along paths the transient should not flow.
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This impeding of the transient energy flow can be considered from the
electromagnetic field or electric circuit viewpoint.
Radiation Shielding: When an electromagnetic field is impeded, the action
is usually called shielding. The shield for a field will be an actual
covering placed around the shielded region. This is not to be confused with a
shield wire which is one or more wires placed between a protected region
(usually power transmission lines) and the direct lightning strike from the
sky. This latter use of the term shield describes a wire used to shunt
lightning transient energy to ground in a conduction mode. See Figure 4.11.
Shields must impede both the electric and magnetic fields, use multiple
layers, account for field frequency, and not leak [I0].
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Figure 4.11: Shield Wires and Shield Enclosure.
Electric fleld shielding depends on surface charge becoming distributed
on the shield so as to Intercept the electric flux generated by external
electric charges. Magnetic shielding depends on the alignment of magnetic
dipoles in the shield so as to cancel the magnetic field flux lines coming
from external current flows or magnetized external sources [7,11].
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Usually with appropriate materials and careful construction, about 40 dB
or more of shielding may be obtained from each layer of shield [12]. If
conductive paths exist between shield layers, they behave as a single layer.
If a shield is desired in just a particular frequency region, it may be
possible to have connections between shields at other frequencies. But care
must be taken that multiple period effects do not nullify the shield for long
lasting transients. Two totally isolated shields, one inside the other, each
providing 40 dB of shielding would provide 80 dB of overall shielding.
dB = 10 log PI/P2
where P1 is transient power outside the shield, and P2 is transient power
inside the shield. Each shield layer must be separated from other layers for
the frequency range of shielding. If these shields are connected by a low
impedance path over some frequency range, charge will distribute between the
two layers. The two shields will be degraded to a single shield in that
frequency range.
Generally, shields have a greater effect as the frequency increases.
This is not totally true when there are openings in the shield, or when the
shield is a mesh. If the shield has non-homogeneous resistivity in dimensions
that are small relative to the dominant wavelengths of the transient, then the
shielding effectiveness can be greatly reduced.
When openings are not electrically sealed, energy may leak into or out of
the break in the enclosure compromising the shield layer. Dielectric
insulation between layers must be adequate to withstand the expected maximum
potential difference between the shield layers.
Transient Conduction Reduction: Increasing the circuit impedance to the
transient energy impedes the transient current flow in the electronics. This
is done either by capitalizing on the difference in frequency spectra of the
transient and the desired signal, and/or deactivating and isolating the
circuit for the duration of the transient. Filters, optical links, fuses, and
circuit breakers are three components that may be used to impede transient
energy.
The lightning spectrum covers a wide frequency range. Filters may be
placed in the lines to offer a low impedance to the signal or power spectrum
while excluding most of the transient spectrum.
Carrying the impedance concept even further, signals can be converted to
light frequency spectra and transmitted along an optical fiber. Optical
fibers have a very high impedance to dominant frequencies in the frequency
spectra of a lightning transient.
A fuse is a portion of a circuit which after certain conditions are
satisfied will have an altered conductivity. Current limiting fuses may
change from a low to a higher impedance after prolonged excessive current.
Other fuses may open completely providing no further current flow unless the
fuse arcs over with very high transient voltages. The use of a fuse to
provide something relatively cheap to burn up instead of a more expensive
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electronic or protection component must also be considered. Fuses are
extremely slow devices when compared to zener diodes, but may be faster than
the movement required by a circuit breaker. However, the circuit breaker Is
usually reusable and may even be automatically reset after the transient is
over.
4.2.3 Malntalnance of Data Integrity
Shunting of transients, while isolating the electronic components from
damage, will often cause interruptions in the flow of signals and power
between electronic subsystems and the connected sensors, controllers, and
systems outside the wind turbine facility. Electronic signals, which provide
crucial or llfe-dependent control actions, must be checked for both loss and
possible error. Error correcting codes, multiple transmission of data,
handshake arrangements, etc. must be a part of the control system design.
When a turbine system does fall, the data gathered by the sensors may
provide valuable clues as to the cause. Important data about the wind turbine
failure should be protected from loss caused by lightning transients. This
means the wind turbine designer should protect not only the data portion of
the system, but also the data storage portion of the system from lightningtransient.
4.3 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE
The exact details (such as where shields of what thlchness material and
shape are located, what sizes and types of shunt protectors should be located
at what locations etc.) of designing to reduce the effects of lightning
transients become intimately dependent on the details of the specific wlnd
turbine to be protected. Protection from lightning transients should be
considered in the conceptual stage of the wind turbine design, since add-on
protection may be difficult and/or expensive [13]. The final section of this
chapter presents recommendations on how the wind turbine designer should treat
the following nine areas to minimize lightning transient damage to
electronics.
o structure,
o electronic subsystem enclosures,
o power supply,
o signal and control lines,
o electronics circuitry itself,
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o computer subsystem,
o sensors/transducers,
o actuators, and
o telephone lines.
4.3.1 Structure
Structures capable of conducting lightning current are recommended. The
structure can serve as the primary down-conductor for a direct lightning
strike and as the first stage of shielding for the electronics and/or cabling.
: i_
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4.3.1.1 Tower
Use of piping for the tower legs, with the cabling inside these legs, or
a large hollow metallic support with the electronic equipment housings located
inside the tower is good transient protection design. More on this subject is
covered in Chapter 2.
4.3.1.2 Equipment Rooms
Electronic equipment rooms should be located so that the magnetic fields
produced by direct lightning strike conduction are minimal. As shown in
Figure 4.8 equipment rooms should be placed in the center of the down
conduction region. For added protection rooms should be placed inside a solid
conductive outer covering [14]. To obtain another layer of shielding,
electronic subsystem rooms should be dlelectrlcally isolated from the outer
conductive structure so that no common electrical connection exists between
the outer structure and the conductlvely sheathed electronic equipment room.
This makes the equipment room covering a topologically distinct shielding
layer from the tower structure. This insulation of the shield is required to
obtain another layer of shielding for transient electric field reduction.
4.3.2 Electronic Subsystem Enclosures
To protect electronic equipment from lightning damage it is recommended
that at least two levels of electric field shielding are utilized. At least
40 dB of shielding should be obtainable from each shield layer. This would
reduce an 8,000 volt per centimeter electric field to under 0.8 volts per
centimeter. One or more layers of Mu-metal may be used to reduce the magnetic
field if it is necessary to locate sensitive electronic components
asymmetrically near a direct strike down conductor. In practical situations,
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shielding imperfections must be considered. Major factors which influence the
shielding effectiveness include: the material used to make the shield;
workmanship during assembly of the shield; the method used to Join pieces of
metal making up the shield, such as welding; the design of shield enclosure
doors, gaskets; the method used for cable and mechanical penetration;
grounding and shield integrity.
4.3.2.1 Material
Both solid and meshed material with high conductivity and/or permeability
can be used. Solld wall enclosures provide more effective shielding than
meshes or screens. Among the most cost-effectlve shielding materials are
sheets of cold-rolled steel and Mu-metal [12]. The main disadvantage of
cold-rolled steel is its weight. The shielding enclosure may be constructed
of materials such as copper screening or galvanized after-weave hardwarecloth.
i
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4.3.2.2 Assembly and Fabrication
The least expensive form of metal Joining is to provide some type of
pressure contact at the Joint. Pressure can be obtained by nailing folded
overlapping shielding material to a wooden strut. Thls method of Joining
seams will generally provide protection in the order of 30 to 50 dB [12].
Higher performance can be obtained by using prefabricated panel-type
enclosures. Solid-wall bolt-together enclosures attenuate external fields in
the order of 60 to 80 dB depending on the number and tension of the bolts
[12]. The best shielding performance is obtained using welded Joint
cold-rolled sheets or Mu-metal panels. Welded seam enclosures can attenuate
external fields in excess of I00 dB [12].
4.3.2.3 Doors
Shielding usually decreases in the viclnlty of a door. The problem comes
from a reduced electrical continuity between the door and the enclosure.
Resillent flngerstock made of flexible brass fingers attached to the door can
increase this electrical continuity. The flngerstock should be installed so a
wiping action wlll occur when the door is opened or closed. Long term
shielding performance can be improved by using multiple rows of flngerstock,
placed in recessed slots. Recessed slots wlll reduce the damage to the
flngerstock caused by dlrt and abrasion [12].
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4.3.2.4 Gaskets and Seams
Any type of corrosion between the joints of conducting metal sheets will
reduce the attenuation of a shield. It is important to keep the electrical
mating surface of nonwelded Joints from corrosion by plating with tin, gold,
palladium, platinum, or silver. Adequate pressure must be provided
continuously along the mating surfaces. This can be done using a linear array
of bolts with about i00 ib of force per linear inch. These bolts must be
retightened occasionally to maintain pressure at the Joint. Electromagnetic
gaskets are made of conducting material which will deform to the
irregularities at the seam Joints. Such gaskets are very useful in
reconditioning leaking shield Joints [10,12].
4.3.2.5 Cables
Communication and power supply cables must be electrically hardened. A
metallic continuous solid-wall cylindrical outer conduit is good practice.
This outer shield should be as thick as possible and should not be used as a
signal return path. Co-axial cables and/or twisted pairs are run inside the
conduit. Pairs are twisted so that on average the same, i.e. a common,
voltage is induced in both wires. This common voltage can be eliminated from
signals carried as the difference in voltage between the wires by use of a
differential amplifier on the receiving end of the cable [10,12].
4.3.2.6 Grounding Precautions and Shielding Integrity
Ideally a shield enclosure would be totally isolated. However, total
isolation of the shield is not possible since penetrations must exist for
things such as plumbing, waveguides, and grounding conductors. If not done
properly, these penetrations will seriously degrade the shield.
Grounding conductors, waveguldes, and plumbing should not be allowed to
penetrate the shield without electrical contact with the shield. Power and
signal conductors must be isolated or connected to the shield through a surge
arrester or filter. These techniques for maintaining shielding integrity are
illustrated in Figure 4.12 [15]. Screens or other electromagnetic shielding
material must be placed over any openings in the enclosure needed to provide
such things as air ventilation [10,12].
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4.3.3 Power Supply Considerations
Since the extensive power llne network is often struck during a storm, it
is one of the most likely sources of lightning transients to electronic
equipment. For this reason the power supply is the most likely llnk for
transients into the electronic equipment_
4.3.3.1 Dedicated Power Line
A dedicated power llne is one which runs only from the power distribution
box to the electronics subsystem. This llne must not run to other equipment
within the facility. At least three reasons suggest this as a good practice.
First, inductive reactance transients are generated by other equipment such as
motors, switches, and contactors by their inductive activity. It is best to
keep the environment for the electronics as quiet as possible by isolating it
from this nolse-produclng equipment. Second, this other equipment, depending
on the location within the facility, also increases the exposure of
electronics equipment at the site to sources of local lightning transient
conduction. The third reason is that loops must be avoided. All wiring must,
to the maximum extent feasible, use a tree configuration. This is the only
way to have wiring within the facility that will not be a potential for
transient modification of loop voltages. This loop may be one that exists all
of the time, or may be one that is created during the lightning transient by
arcing.
Generally it is mcre expensive to create a dependable low transient level
power llne. Most equipment does not need the degree of quiet power required
by the electronics. Thus, the expense of providing quiet power should be
restricted to the equipment that must have it, such as the electronics.
4.3.3.2 Power Line Side Transient Suppression
Before the power has entered the wind turbine facility, transient
suppression devices such as lightning arresters have been provided by the
electrical utility. Still needed is a device close to the power supply input
which will prevent extremely short-duratlon spikes from entering. These sharp
hlgh-frequency spikes, if allowed to enter the power supply, may then
propagate to other places in the electronics subsystem by conduction,
radiation, and/or capacitive and inductive coupling.
Special power llne transient suppressor equipment for electronic
equipment has been developed. Such suppressors will shunt exces3 current to
ground with a very fast response time and maintain nominal operating voltage
at the power supply input terminals. A typical transient suppressor can
handle 2,000 to 3,000 watts of peak power for a duration of milliseconds and
with a response time of 5 nanoseconds [16].
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A study conducted by Richard Odenberg [17] concluded that the placement
of the transient suppressor is extremely important. The suppressor should be
installed so that the lead length from the suppressor to the load under its
protection is made as short as possible. The effectiveness of the transient
suppressor is inversely proportional to the length of the connecting leads.
4.3.3.3 Electronics Side Suppression and Isolation
Faster suppression at a lower power rating is required on the electronic
component side of the power supply. For systems which have adc supply
feeding a number of subunits, such as printed circuit cards, a higher
relatively unregulated dc voltage can be fed to the printed circuit (p.c.)
cards in common. The supplied de voltage is then regulated down to the
desired voltage at each card. In addition a transient suppression device
should be on each card with the regulator. The margin voltage for regulation,
also is a margin which allows clipping of any voltage fluctuations received
between the main power supply and the p.c. card. If a transient successfully
enters the interior of the power supply, on-card transient suppression
minimizes the ri_k of destroying components on every p.c. card. Although
redundancy generally increases as devices are placed in parallel, this is true
only if a portion of the devices can carry the entire load. Hence a single
suppression device failure should not cripple the system. When Transzorbs and
MOV devices fail, they generally fall in the shorted mode [9,18]. A slow blow
fuse in series with the suppressor device is suggested to prevent failure of
the entire unit because of the shorting of a suppressor on one p.c. card.
4.3.4 Signal and Control Line Considerations
Signal and control lines must not be permitted to take lightning
transle_t energy into the relatively delicate electronics component
environment. In addition it is often impossible to prevent many local ground
loops inside the electronics subsystem enclosures. That is, the tree
structure of Chapter 2 may be impossible to implement from an electronic
subsystem requirement perspective because of timing and propagation delay
constraints. For such situations the electronics environment must receive the
very minimum exposure to electrical transients.
Signal lines are usually less rugged than the control lines, especially
analog input sensor lines. During a direct lightning strike to the wind
turbine tower, it is the goal of the lightning protection design to seal off
the electronic subsystem boxes from the harsh outside transient world and to
prevent the external wiring from being destroyed. After the transient passes,
operation can be quickly resumed.
\
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4.3.4.1 Transient Suppressors
Transient suppressors are placed both in series with shields and as
shunts at the ends of cables. Suppressors provide for both shunt protection
of electronics and augment the transient current path. Suppressors become low
impedance when the voltage exceeds a specified threshold. To prevent
destruction of the cabling, suppressors in series with the shields are used as
described in the next section. Shunt use of the supressor is to seal off the
electronics enclosure from transient energy attempting to enter from the
outside via the cable or wiring. Cable transient suppressors should either be
located Just outside the electronics enclosure, or inside an entry box
attached to the electronics enclosure.
i
4.3.4.2 Shielding
Shields are often connected to local ground at only one end to minimize
the risk of a ground loop. For lightning protection, the shield may provide
yet another path to help get rid of excess lightning transient energy.
Analysis of the electrical properties of cables subject to lightning reveals
possible transient reduction by multiple point grounding of cable shields
[I0]. It is recommended that cable shields be grounded at multiple points
through reverse biased diodes that will permit large voltage currents to flow
along the shield while acting to prevent instrumentation level voltage loops
from occurring. Additionally, the usual use of twisted pairs with
differential llne receivers and low-lmpedance drivers, respectively, to cancel
and minimize noise pickup, also helps to reduce lightning transients. Series
diodes are placed as shown in Figure 4.13.
Shields must not be violated by the breakdown of a shield suppressor.
Sufficient dielectric must be present between shield layers to prevent such a
breakdown. The shield suppressor must take energy to the system ground and
not to the nex_ interior level of shielding. Separate layers of shield
topology must be maintained. This may require an i[_llne transient filter on
cables, which must be located between shield layers. An alternate means of
maintaining shield separation is to use optical fibers. Optical fibers may be
used for the transmission of data between shield layers. To a much lesser
extent power may also be transferred between layers using optical fibers.
4.3.4.3 Optical Isolation Techniques
An optical communications system can serve as a means of electrically
isolating one electronic subsystem from another. An optical fiber, used to
link the communication transmitter and receiver, provides a nonconducting path
betw=en the electronic subsystems. However, even this optical fiber cannot
totally isolate electronic circuitry from lightning transients.
The essential elements of an optical communication system are shown in
Figure 4.14. The transmitter source is usually a solid state injection laser
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Figure 4.!3: Using The Cable Shield to Carry Lightning Transient Current.
or hlgh-radiance light emitting diode. The main component in the receiver is
a photo-detector. The operating ccpabilit_es of any lightwave communlcat:ion
system are determined by:
t_
i. the loss and dispersion characteristics of the fiber and any
termlnat ions ;
2. the average amount of light power which can be injected into the
fiber; and
3. the sensitivity of the photodetector [19,20].
The nonmetallic opClcal fiber used for signal transmission is a light
wavegulde of dielectric materlai. The electromagnetic fields generated by a
typical lightning current wavesbape are of a frequency that won't enter the
fiber optics, However it may be possible that the bright visual flash
associated wlth arcing could intrude into this light wavegulde. If fiber
optics are less likely to have data contaminated during transmission they may
require less sophisticated error detection techniques. Thls could mean a
decrease in total cost of data links. Also an optical transmission system
needs no return llne and the signal is not referenced to any particular ground
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potential.
level.
Hence data transmission can be achieved without regard to ground
A number of modulation techniques can, theoretically, be used to impress
the desired information on the lightwave. Digital modulation of the light
source coupled with square-law detection represents the most practical scheme.
The desired information is carried by the optical fiber as a series of light
pulses which are detected and demodulated at the receiving end of the system.
Pulse code modulation (PCM) is an ideal candidate for optical data
transmission since the information is contained within the presence or absence
of light as opposed to information being contained in the magnitude of the
detected light. Pulse position modulation (PPM) is attractive for analog
signals because of low duty cycle. High peak power lasers can be used and
noise immunity is achieved, as with PCM, by expanding the bandwidth of the
baseband signal to take advantage of the broad band capability of the fibers.
The total optical communication system Is not completely free from
external Interference. Although electromagnetic ene-_y does not enter the
system through the fiber transmission llne, It can enter by way of the
transmltter/recelver electronics. This generally manifests Itself in the form
of interrupted data bits and noise interpreted as data by the receiver.
Hence, it is necessary to provide proper shielding aud grounding to protect
the photodetector and associated electronic circuits [19,21]. The opening
through which the fiber enters the receiver needs to be small compared to the
wavelength of the highest frequency component of lightning.
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Due to the numerous control and monitoring functions which must be
carried out by the turbine control processor, a large number of transmission
lines are required to sense system parameters and to transmit action signals.
A single, large bandwidth, optical fiber transmission llne could easily handle
the required data transfer. Figure 4.15 illustrates a system which would
require a single optical fiber to transmit information to the control
processor. This same fiber could also be used to transmit control information
from the processor to various electro_uechanical systems on the ground and in
the nacelle.
°,
" .
CONTROL I
SIGNAL THROUGH "--------I
OPTICAL DATA LI_ i
MODULATOR
PROCESSOR
Figure 4.15: Single Fiber Multiplexed Optical Communication System.
The electronic devices required to perform the various signal proceasing
functions in the transmitter and receiver sections require relatively small
amounts of current. It may be advantageous in some cases to use battery packs
to supply dc biasing currents and voltages. The battery supply should be
placed in the same enclosure as the injection laser, LED, or detector
circuitry, requiring perhaps once a year replacement. It may also be possible
to transmit the required power through fiber optics.
Most large hor!zontal-axls wind turbines will bring signals from the
nacelle through slip rings. This is necessary because of the 360 degrees
rotation capability of the nacelle for proper orientation with respect to the
wind direction. "Optical slip rings" do now exist, so that no problems should
be encountered if full 360 degrees rotation of the nacelle is required.
Although optical fiber cables are as flexibie as most cables, they could not
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withstand multiple twists. If a limited rotation of the nacelle is allowed,
no sllp ring assembly would be required and the twisting of the optical cable
could be accommodated by a large "slack loop" in the cable from the nacelle to
an optical cable conduit, or to a tie point at the tower.
4.3.5 Hardenln$ Techniques for Electronic .Circuitry
Analysis must be performed at the circuit level to determine the
characteristics (magnitude, duration, waveshapes, etc.) of the smallest
signal that will cause the burnout of the most susceptible component contained
within the circuit under consideration. Individual component damage level is
a function of frequency. Therefore, for pulsed input signal transients, the
spectral composition must be known to determine the pulse power that will
cause permanent damage (although soft failures may also result in overall
circuit malfunctions). The validity of a damage threshold analysis requires
an accurate data base of actual and rated damage levels. This data base
allows for the complete characterization of the pulse-power response of all
electronic components [22,23,24].
Typical llghtnlng-lnduced signals are composed of high-amplitude, short-
duration transients which result in a nonlinear response by the individual
component or particular circuit [25,26]. These responses are not defined by
existing device models, thus requiring the examination of each component in
order to develop _ppropriate models. A detailed damage-threshold analysis of
a circuit may be performed by utilizing the procedure developed for
Electromagnetic Fulse Protection [27].
Any circuit node which is exposed to a llghtning-lnduced transient must
be analyzed to determine its damage-threshold level [25,26]. An examination
of wind turbine control/Instrumentatlon electronics indicates that numerous
exposed ports are possible. Each must be analyzed separately and in
combination with other circuit ports to completely characterize the
susceptibility of the electronic circuits/devices to lightnlng transients.
When analyzing multl-port combinations it is necessary to determine the
amplitude and phase chacacteristlcs for the transient signal sources. Unless
a relationship between both the phace and amplitude of two or more transients
can be defined, an infinite number of combinations of these two parameters can
cause a device failure. Given the proper phase/amplitude relationship, a
single combination of transient Input-port voltages will determine the failure
thresholds for the circuit or device.
For llghtnlng-lnduced transients the exact nature of the signal cannot be
determined in a manner which will allow the designer to set exact responses of
a circuit from induced and direct effects [22,23]. Therefore, one is forced
to perform worst-case analysis in which the highest or most potentially
damaging circumstances are assumed to exist. An In-depth Failure _lode and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) of component parts may single out components most
susceptible to damage. Such analyses are performed utilizing the best
possible lightning models and estimation of signal trsnslent voltage/current.
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Once lightning parameters %ave been determined, it may be possible to
reduce the multi-port analysis problem to one of simpler proportions. In most
cases, one of the transfer impedances will dominate, in which case the
multi-port nature of the circuit response to external excitation may be
ignored and the analysis may be conducted considering only the dominant
impedance and transient source.
Before damage analysis of a circuit or component can be performed, the
component's power profiles, P(f_; must be known [27]. Several know_ data
bases contain this information [22,23,24]. The development of models that
will predict the failure levels of Junction semiconductor devices have
commanded a great amount of attention [27,28,29,30,31,32]. This fact is, of
course, due to the susceptibility of semiconductor devices to pulse power
burnout, which identifies these devices as the most critical components in any
circuit.
The Wunsch model has been widely viewed as the most general model
available for transient response damage [22]. In this particular model the
pulse power required to burn out a semiconductor junction is related to the
pulse width and has the formula:
-1/2
Pj = Krt
where Pj is the required pulse power for failure of the junction and t is the
pulse duration. K r is referred to as the Wunsch constant. For a parti6ular
device it is dependent upon device geometry and material.
The model was originally developed and evaluated for devices operating at
reverse bias and subjected to pulse widths between 20 and 50 nanoseconds. To
obtain a value for the current to produce a junction failure, lj , the pulse
power, Pj , can be divided by the reverse bias breakdown voltage to give:
-1/2
Po K t
= 3 . r
VBD VBD
where VBD is the junction breakown voltage in the reverse bias direction. In
order to determine the device power, PD , necessary to produce failure, bulk
resistance heating effects must be included.
PD ffiI jVD ffiPj + PB = IjVBD + I_RB
where V D is the voltage across the device, P B is the power dissipated in the
bulk material, and R B is the bulk resistance. For many devices the bul_
resistance may be neglected, thus simplifying any experimental determination
of device constants.
The power necessary to produce
conditions can be approximated as:
-I
PF ffi KFt
Junction failure under forward-blas
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iwhere K_ is called the forward bias damage constant [27]. When a
semlcondhctor junction is operated under forward-bias conditions, large
current variations are possible, resulting from extremely small changes in the
forward voltage. For thls reason, forward-blased devices may be more
susceptible to failure than reverse-blased Junctions.
For a forward-blased Junction that is operated near failure, the current
will be large, with the device power approximated by,
PD 2
= IjR B
The power dissipated in the junction will be small in comparison with the bulk
resistance power dissipated within the device.
In the forward bias state, the source will appear to resemble a constant
current due to the small value of the bulk resistance. Under these conditions
the power will be proportional to the bulk resistance. This me_ne that the
value of R B forward be known through experimental or estimation techniques.
The bulk resistance term in the powe_ models takes on varied importance
depending upon the biasing conditions of the particular device applications.
The bulk resistacne of a forward biased device is normally small (0.I to IO
ohms). A higher value for R B forward is associated wlth low-power devices
which have small junction areas and limited current capabilities. The lower
forward bulk resistance values are normally associated with high power devices
which can handle large currents and therefore require large junction areas.
Devices which are operated under reverse-biased conditions typically have
bulk resistance values between I00 and i0,000 ohms or more. Under these blas
conditions a particular device with a low bulk resistance will have low
breakdown voltage while a high bulk resistance will be associated with a large
breakdown voltage. It should Ee emphasized that the information above Is
general in nature and that each device has a particular set of parameters
which are dependent upon the device type, material, doping, configuration,
contact material and geometry, etc. To summarize: when performing a
failure-threshold analysis on low-power, low-breakdown-voltage devices
operated under pulsed reverse-biased conditions, the bulk resistance can be
neglected. When analysing high breakdown voltage devices which are pulsed in
the reverse direction and Junctions pulsed in the forward-biased direction,
the bulk resistance term must be taken into account.
A very thorough and complete description of the exact procedures,
including example problems, for transient failure ....lysls of circuits and
devices may be found in references [22,23,24,27]. Although the material
presented within these referenced works is directed toward electromagnetic
pulse electronic analysis, the same procedures are directly applicable to
electronic clrcult/devlce llghtning-tnduced transient failure analysis. The
expense of a complete analysis may be Justified if a large number of wind
turbines are produced.
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4.3.6 Computer Subsystem Considerations
The computer subsystem in the modern wind turbine system is the heart of
the system monitoring, decision making, and control. It is imperative to
provide automatic mechanical failsafe capabilities to prevent disastrous wind
turbine actions. Increasingly, the electronics control is also providing for
new important additional turbine safety activities. Decisions which involve
complex combinations of conditions are natural areas for automatic electronic
safety intervention. Decisions such as those associated with power
synchronization and start-up procedures are usually performed by electronics
control.
Some means of computer subsystem verification is essential, for both the
hardware and the software. Transient activity may damage just a portion of
the data, program, or hardware. This damage may go unnoticed until some
crucial situation arises. Thus, the system must be inspected periodically
using an external or internal method. Self checks by the computer may satisfy
much of this requirement.
b
4.3.6.1 Error Detection
Errors may be detected in digital data by the use of codes. A parity bit
may be added to each digital word. Even better, check sums may be added to
groups of digital words. Error correcting codes permit automatic correction
of the data when one or a few bits are in error. Multiple storage of the data
will permit retrieval of the data when one source has been corrupted.
Redundancy may be extended to multiple crosschecklng computer systems. The
software may crosscheck sensors or check instrumentation readings against
reasonable limit values to be expected. Automatic checking of values for
reasonable ranges is also possible and desirable. Crosschecking of related
types of readings for concurrence is another approach to error detection. The
error priorities and actions to be taken must be stored in the system memory.
Some errors may require the shutdown of the wind turbine system. For other
errors a provision for requesting human intervention may be sufficient.
Computer integrity, upset, and destruction are important considerations
in lightning protection design. Wind turbines normally employ software which
has progressed beyond the developmental stage where the programs are
frequently changed and thus kept on disk or tape for loading into RAM.
Instead the programs will probably reside in ROM or EPROM or EEPROM. Without
destruction of the storage chip it is hard to degrade data in these more
permanent forms. Provisions must be made for periodically checking the
integrity of the system software and hardware. A comparison of software sets
is one means of determining software integrity. At least the critical
portions of the software could be redundantly stored for checking.
Periodically, a self-check routine should be run on the machine. For very
high reliability operations, this can be done continuously with jumps to
routines which perform other useful work amidst the certification checks.
B
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Data for wind turbine shutdown is important for protection of personnel
and equipment. The critical data must be carefully handled to prevent costly
malfunction of the turbine, Sensor and computer generated data may be used
for shutdo_, and control. All storage and handling of this data must be done
with a high degree of reliability. Thus the use of error correcting codes
and, possibly, multiple processors for larger wind turbine systems is
recommended. Monitoring data should be transferred on a periodic basis and
during shutdown to a more permanent medium such as magnetic tape or disk, or
via modem and communication link to a remote storage facility.
V
4.3.6.2 Data Retention
Power generation records must be kept, and the computer system which can
monitor and calculate the power is a reliable and accurate device for doing
this task. Other reasons also exist for the retention of data about the wind
turbine system operation as discussed below.
The computer system can monitor an immense variety of conditions
throughout the wind turbine system including vibration data, temperatures of
large bearings, acoustic analysis, etc. Such data can be very useful in
anticipating both mechanical and electrical component failures. In the event
of a system shutdown due to lightning transients, it is important that
long-term performance data not be lost. Memory devices for temporarily
retaining sensor or productivity data include electrically erasable
programmable read only memory (EEPROM), magnetic storage media, and battery
backed-up random access memory (RAM). Such devices can hold a small amount of
data placed there for some time span prior to and during failure. A sensor
can read the system llne voltage and initiate a write command to preserve key
data. This can be done before substantial charge has been used from the
computer filter capacitors in the power supply. Alternately, an
uninterruptible power source (UPS) can provide computer power for some minutes
or hours after wind turbine failure.
While performance monitoring may best be used to prevent wind turbine
failures, performance data collected during a failure can be extremely helpful
in finding reason for the failure.
4.3.7 Sensor_/Transducers
The sensors in the 'ransducers of the wind turbine electronics subsystem
sense thermal, mechanical, and electrical values. The total transducer then
converts these sensed quantities into some electrical form that can be
processed, more often than not by a digital processor. Some of these
parameters, such as high wind speed, or excess strain on tower structure
components, or excessive voltages due to electrical component failure are very
critical for safety. Transients caused by lightning can destroy or degrade
sensors.
o
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N 4.3.7. I Sacrlficlal
It may be less expensive to allow the sensor/transducer of a noncritical
measurement to be destroyed than to attempt to build a unit able to withstand
a direct lightning strike. This is especially true of those units located on
top of the wind turbine where the large current of a direct strike is
possible. Critical sensors/transducers can be provided in multiple locations
to allow for the failure of one of the critical units.
4.3.7.2 hardened
If it is desired to harden a sensor/transducer to withstand lightning
transients, then the shunting and shielding techniques previously described
would be applicable. However, protection must not degrade the performance of
the sensors. An alternative to protecting an existing transducer is to design
or select very rugged transducers. Such transducers would have the capacity
to carry a high current, have no internal solid state devices which are
sensitive to high voltage gradients, and have br_sh bypassing or strapping
around any moving parts. Those units on the top of the wind turbine must be
assumed to be expendable. Nonetheless hardening such instrumentation can
provide protection against side streamers and the less severe main strokes.
4.3.7.3 Multi-located
Sensors/transducers can be placed at different locations on the turbine
to reduce the probability that a single lightning strike wlll damage them all.
For example, anemometers on the roof of a turbine nacelle should be placed as
far apart as possible.
4.3.7.4 Information Overlap
Some sensors may provide data _hat, with some processing, can hint at or
aliow deduction of other conditions. For example blade settings, along with
power output of the turbine, could allow an estimate of the wind speed. Thus,
the retention of sufficient data to perform such diagnostic analysis Is an
essential goal of the system designer.
4.3.8 Actuators
Actuators tend to be more rugged than sensors. The drive electronics is
able to withstand greater power surges than the sensor electronics. Even so,
the extreme nature of lightning transients is sufficient to jeopardize the
actuators. Arrestors and supressors should be used to bring the levels of
transient power and voltage below the values that the actuators and the
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Jactuator electronics csn withstand. If the drive electronics is located close
to the mechanical actuators, then the data from the command electronics will
be vulnerable to corruption, and encoding and modulation to protect the
integrity of this data must be used. Local isolation and protection of input
from transients on the line must be provided. The local control must have a
means of carrying on without the d_ta for a few milliseconds to a second or
longer while a lightning transient disrupts communications within the wind
turbine system. A means of protection against local failures should also be
provided. If the drive electronics subsystem is some distance from the
mechanical actuators, then loop voltage changes due to a strike may be a
problem on the connecting lines. Once again, even the larger drive voltages
to an actuator are small when compared to those in a lightning strike.
4.3.9 Telephone Lines
Telephone lines are becoming increasingly important for the remote
monitoring and control of sophisticated equipment. Monitoring and control
will usually be th_ugh a modem rather than a direct-coupled llne. The
telephone usually provides a degree of protection from outside transients
through an arrester. Additional protection for the modem using hlgh speed
suppression devices is also good practice.
In addition, the telephone company will also be concerned with the
voltages that may accidentally be placed on the telephone llne by the wind
+"'_-^ system. Care must be taken with telephone lines at all power_L U_LL_
generating facilities by following all applicable electrical codes. Wind
turbines are generally located at places with a high lightning transient
exposu[e and it may be necessary to go beyond the protection called for In the
existing electrical codes.
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Chapter 5
BLADE PROTECTION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Lightning strikes that directly hit the wind turbine will probably attach
to the blade. The damage occurring to the blade could cause excess structural
damage. The blade and hub usually represent around one fourth of the cost of
a large modern machine and may be the most expensive components to replace.
The blade is not only the llnk between wind energy and the mechanical energy
going to the gearbox, but could be a lightning llnk to all the equipment
associated with the wind turbine. This chapter addresses protection of
metallic and nonmetallic blades from lightning damage.
5.2 BLADE DAMAGE
Aircraft and electr_ca! power industry e_glneers have had experience in
dealing with lightning. Even though most aircraft lightning strikes are from
cloud to cloud, similar protection techniques are applicable to ground based
wind turbine blades. Most of the power industries' experience deals with
surge protection of llne transformer and other power equipment. Some of the
work on tower protection and modeling is useful in evaluating blade protection
techniques.
The book, "Lightning Protection of Aircraft" [I] is the source of much of
the information that follows. Lightning strikes to metal aircraft wings
lllustrate what might be expected if a metal wird turbine blade sustainc a
direct hit. Composite m-ater!a!s that have been proposed in blade construction
normally are poor electrical conductors and could be damaged if a l[ghtnlng
protection system is not provided. Fiberglass radomes with no lightning
protection have been rendered useless and hazardous to flight when struck bylightning [I].
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5 • 3 METALLIC BLADES
Both steel and aluminum will continue to be the major metals used in
blade construction. Even though the metallic structure used in blades serves
as a good conducting path, damage can still occur to metal blades. The damage
that can be expected on metallic blades includes melting at lightning
attachment points, magnetic stress, and pitting from arcing at
discontinuities.
A discussion of melting at attachment points [I| indicates that it should
be of llttle concern to manufacturers of metallic blades. Temperature rise of
metallic blades carrying lightning currents is temporary and probably will not
effect structural integrity.
Magnetic forces resulting from large lightning currents and certain blade
geometries could cause damage 8uch as permanent bending and/or fatiguing of
the blade structure. Forces on bonding straps used to connect metal to metal
can cause them to be damaged and also cause damage to nearby structures.
These forces result from the interaction of current-carrying conductors and
magnetic fields. The magnitude of these forces depends on the system
geometry, current magnitudes and directions, permeability, and separation
distance. For example, two parallel conductors, each carrying 50,000 amperes
and placed 2 centimeters apart in air, will experience a force of 25,000 N/m
(1,713 lb/ft). Bonding straps should have sufficient cross sectional area to
carry lightning currents; they should be short; bends should be smooth and
less than 45 degrees; and parallel straps should be sufficiently separated.
Arcing could occur around hinges and pivot points on a blade. The
control surface pivot points on some blades such as the MOD-2 blade [2] could
produce some arcing if in the position shown in Figure 5.1. There ell1
continue to be tip or blade pivot points on large horizontal wind turbine
blades. The use of bonding straps, and/or blade positioning procedures during
a thunderstorm will aid in _he protection of these pivot points.
Strike history and simulatlon tests will shoe whether or not engineering
analysis is valid. Only minor damage is expected to occur to metallic blades,
bu_ tip lights, ice detectors, strain gauges, and other components attached to
the blade are more apt to be damaged. Damage to these components can be
reduced if lightning protection is designed into the instrument system.
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Figure 5.1: A Typical Tip Control Mechanism.
5.4 NONMETALLIC BLADES
Several nonmetallic blade structures have been considered for large wlnd
turbine blades. Both fiberglass and wood composites appear to be viable
alternatives to steel and aluminum, but because flberglass and wood are both
poor conductors, a direct strike to either could cause severe damage.
Fiberglass radomes have been shattered by real and simulated lightning [I]
when no protection was provided. It has been shown that epoxy-wood blades
wlll be severely damaged if no protection is provided [3].
The following principle for provldln8 protection to nonmetallic
structures can be used for accommodatlng strikes to blades. By providing a
good conducting path on the surface of the nonconducting blade, lightning
currenta wlll not flow inside the structure. Thls is shown in Figure 5.2.
Five acceptable ways of providing an external conducting path are shown tn
Table 5.1. The co,_ments on the table should serve as a general guide to those
a
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fconsidering protecting nonmetallic blades. Compatibility with manufacturing
processes and other factors should be considered in the design of lightning
protection of blao Coordination with vendors of these materials is a
recommended step bef e reaching a decision on the method of protection.
Figure 5.2:
GI-ITNING BOLT
"__PATHI (EXTERNAL)
ATH 2 (INTERNAL)
-/////_/////////////////////.._/////
External Charge Transfer and Internal Streamerlng.
Nonmetallic blades may have some structural weight and cost advantages
over metaltlc blades. Furthermore the television and communication
interference caused by metalUc blades is eliminated. However, tests have
shown that both fiberglass [4] and wood blades [5] need some type of lightning
accommodation system. Damage to a fiberglass blade on NASA's Mod-O machine is
shown in Figure 5.3 [6].
Bankaitls [3] points out that blade lightning protection systems must be:
I. capable of dissipating the energy imparted by a lightning strike
without deleterious effects to personnel, structure, or
instrumentation,
2. inexpensive to install and maintain,
3. compatible with the processes by which wind-driven turbine rotor
blades are manufactured,
4. capable of withstanding repeated lightning strikes,
5. easily repaired in the field, and
6. nonlnterfering with television reception or navigational or
communication equipment functions.
In meeting all these requirements the designed system shall not compromise the
structural integrity of the rotor blade.
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TABLE 5.1
Ways to Provide External Conducting Path
PRODUCT
Conductive Tape
Conductive Paint
Alumnized glass
cloth or metal-
glass cloth
Diverter Strips
Scree_ mesh
I
,METHOD OF APPLICATION
Position as required
apply pressure.
Soldering or welding
to metal surfaces.
Brush or spray.
Put in place and
secure to blade
using an appropriate
adhesive or process.
Apply to blade non-
conducting surface
and solder or weld
to metal surfaces.
Apply adhesive to
nonconducting
surface and weld or
solder to metallic
surfaces.
CO_L_EENTS
I
Apply to the leading and
trailing edge. Aluminum
tape has been shown to
provide protection on
fiberglass blades.
Paint with silver content
has worked on helicopter
blades. Other metals or
alloys used in paint will
require testing.
More than one layer may
be required.
Results should be similar
to tape. The TV interfer-
ence may be less, but the
cost of protection may be
greater.
Wooden blades have been
shown to have adequate
protection with this method
The screen was covered with
epoxy and paint.
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5.5 TESTING
In order to establish the valldlty of a 11ghtnin 8 accommodation system a
test program wlll normally be necessary. Guidelines for such tests are
contained in the SAE Committee Report [7]. The test set-up used for a wooden
blade Is shown in Figure 5.4 [5]. The protection scheme for these blades is
shown In Figure 5.5.
____M__MARX G E__E_R_TO_
L - L60BH
510 R s
C L - 912pF
C_=0.02_F
I
I HIGH-
VOLTAGE
ELECTRODE
VOLTAGE
MEASURD[ENT
DIVIDER
450 pF
!
m
Figure 5.4: Test Circuit for Simulated Strike Attachment Tests.
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CONDUCTOR.
(c) NO ACCOMMODATIONS.
Figure 5.5: Sketch of Wooden Blade Test Specimen.
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS ANDRECOMNENDATIONS
Blade structures may be damaged by lightning strikes. The damage to
metallic blades usually wlll not interfere with turbine operation, but
materials that are nonconductors such as fiberglass and wood need to have some
type of lightning accomodation system. The conclusion given by Bankaitls [3]
after a series of blade tests [5] is recorded below. Observation of test data
on two types of blades and protection systems form the basis for these
conclusions.
I. Composite-structural-material rotor blades require a lightning
accommodation system whether or not the blades contain internal
wiring or metallic components.
2. The basic lightning accommodation concepts examined in these series
of tests do effectively contain the charge on the surface of the
rotor blade and prevent internal streamering. An alumlnium screen
covering effectively prevents internal streaaeri1_ even with a metal
conductor component inside the specimen.
98
Adhesive-backed aluminum tape (153 mm by 0.20 mm) properly
accommodates currents In excess of 200 kA without structural damage
to the composlte-material rotor blade, and with only very local
damage to the tape Itself. The local damage at the point of
attachment could be easily repairable at very low cost.
4. Keeping discharge currents on the rotor blade surface, speclflcally
by using conductive paths, prevents structure penetration.
A conductive tip cap electrically bonded to the current path down
conductor is mandatory to prevent lightning entry into the spar and
afterbody from the blade tip.
6. Abrupt direction changes of the current paths must be avoided.
Although quantitative data were not obtained, it
moisture content in the structure enhances structure
llghtning currents.
is known that
penetration by
The need to shleld internal steel adapters from causing internal
streamering between themselves and the tip cap over the length of the
internal cavity of the rotor blade has not been clearly
substantiated.
9. Induced voltage effects or any secondary effects on instrumentation,
structures, or components cannot be assessed.
I0. Compliance of the potential lightning accommodation systems with
non-lnterference with television reception has not been defined.
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